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1. Introduction to this Guide 
This guide provides an introduction to the application of tuberculosis (TB) genotyping to 
TB control practices and to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) TB 
Genotyping Program. It was written by the National Tuberculosis Controllers Association 
(NTCA)/CDC Advisory Group on Tuberculosis Genotyping and is intended for TB 
controllers, epidemiologists, laboratorians, and other program staff members who will be 
involved in submitting isolates for genotyping, analyzing and responding to genotyping results, 
or using genotyping data to monitor TB transmission trends. 
This guide does not contain specific directions on how a TB control program must carry 
out its genotyping program. The CDC genotyping program is not a research effort, and 
participating state and local programs are not required to carry out a protocol, submit a certain 
number of isolates, or collect specific data. Rather, this guide provides general guidance about 
how to utilize the genotyping laboratories, how to understand genotyping results, and how to 
apply those results to improve TB control practices. For those interested in the specific 
procedures used by other TB genotyping programs, the Maryland TB program and the New 
York City TB program have agreed to share their procedure manuals; those documents can be 
downloaded from our TB genotyping WebBoard at http://web-tb.forum.cdc.gov.   
Understanding TB genotyping results is not difficult, but it involves learning a new 
vocabulary. It also involves establishing new procedures to ensure that the genotyping results 
can easily be combined with appropriate epidemiologic data to identify instances of recent TB 
transmission. This new vocabulary and these new procedures are the focus of this guide. 
Hopefully, we have developed a guide that helps you master this new subject. 
In the following paragraphs, key concepts are introduced. These concepts are developed 
further in the relevant chapters of the guide. Finally, a glossary in Appendix A defines 
important concepts. Throughout the guide, tables, figures, and text boxes sum up important 
points made in the text. An electronic copy of this guide, the Isolate Submission Form, and 
other genotyping documents can be downloaded from the CDC Tuberculosis Genotyping 
Program’s WebBoard at http://web-tb.forum.cdc.gov.  Copies of the guide can be ordered by 




2. Overview of Tuberculosis Genotyping 
CDC has initiated a laboratory program to provide genotyping services to TB control 
programs. TB genotyping has the potential to change significantly how TB control is 
conducted in this country. By helping to identify TB patients who are involved in recent 
transmission, TB genotyping will have the following impact: 
• Outbreaks will be detected earlier and controlled more rapidly. 
• Incorrect TB diagnoses based on false-positive culture results will be identified more 
easily. 
• Unsuspected relationships between cases and new and unusual transmission settings will 
be discovered. 
• Transmission that occurs between patients who reside in different jurisdictions will be 
detected more readily. 
• TB programs will be able to evaluate completeness of routine contact investigations and 
progress toward TB elimination by monitoring surrogate measures of recent TB 
transmission. 
How does TB genotyping help TB prevention and control practices? 
TB genotyping results, when combined with epidemiologic data, help to distinguish TB 
patients who are involved in the same chain of recent transmission. In the same way, TB 
genotyping helps to identify TB patients whose disease is the result of reactivation of a TB 
infection that was acquired in the past. Since TB prevention and control efforts directed at 
preventing TB transmission are fundamentally different from efforts to prevent reactivation, 
genotyping offers a powerful tool to help direct the application of these different efforts. 
Furthermore, TB genotyping allows us for the first time to monitor our progress toward 
eliminating TB transmission. 
TB genotyping identifies genetic links between Mycobacterium tuberculosis isolates 
from different TB patients. If two TB patients have isolates with nonmatching genotypes, this 
indicates (with very rare exceptions, discussed in Chapter 4, Combining Genotyping and 
Epidemiologic Data to Improve Our Understanding of Tuberculosis Transmission) that the 
two patients are not involved in the same chain of recent transmission (recent transmission is 
defined as TB transmission that has occurred within the previous 2 years). The situation is 
more complex when two patients have isolates with matching genotypes, since, in some of 
these situations, the two patients will be involved in the same chain of recent transmission, but 
in other situations these patients will not be involved in the same chain of recent transmission. 
The key to determining if TB patients with matching genotypes are involved in the same chain 
of recent transmission is to investigate whether the patients share epidemiologic links that can 
explain where and how they might have transmitted TB among themselves.  
If two patients with TB are known to have been in the same place when one of them was 
infectious, the two patients are said to share known epidemiologic links. If two patients have 
isolates with matching genotypes and they also share known epidemiologic links, this provides 
strong evidence that they are involved in the same chain of recent transmission. Patients who 
have isolates with matching genotypes are said to belong to the same genotyping cluster. 
Patients in the same genotyping cluster who share known epidemiologic links are said to 
belong to an epidemiologically confirmed genotyping cluster. 
If two patients have isolates with matching genotypes but have not been found to have 
even possible epidemiologic links (i.e., they live in different locations, work in different 
locations and at different types of jobs, share no risk factors, and did not spend time at any 
common location), it is possible that, despite belonging to the same genotyping cluster, the two 
patients are not involved in the same chain of recent transmission.  
If two patients have matching genotypes and share possible epidemiologic links, 
additional information is needed to decide if the two patients are involved in the same chain of 
recent transmission. For example, the two patients might live in the same neighborhood or they 
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might share a common risk factor (e.g., use of illegal drugs or alcohol). In these cases, TB 
programs should consider conducting what we will call in later chapters of this guide a cluster 
investigation. This type of investigation allows programs to reexamine the information already 
gathered about the patients who belong to the same genotyping cluster and reinterview them to 
search for additional information that might confirm the hypothesis that the patients are 
involved in the same chain of recent transmission. 
Chapter 4, Combining Genotyping and Epidemiologic Data to Improve Our 
Understanding of Tuberculosis transmission describes these definitions in more detail and 
provides a conceptual framework for combining genotyping and epidemiologic information to 




“Through the use of universal genotyping, Kansas has been able to identify 
clusters of cases that would have been hard to identify through standard 
contact and epidemiologic investigations.  We have found the use of 
genotyping particularly useful in working in the homeless communities 
where contact investigations traditionally are very vague and difficult to 
pursue due to the general anonymous nature of the population.  Universal 
Genotyping drew our attention back to active cases who had no apparent 
epidemiological link, but as a result of more intensified investigations, 
further cases were not only linked, but additional case finding activities led 
to new cases being diagnosed early in the disease process. Maybe even 
more significant was the fact the genotyping results provided indisputable 
evidence of case to case transmission.  As a result, the shelters who have 
housed the homeless have become far more willing and interested in 
partnering with public health efforts to control and eliminate TB in their 
population.  Universal Genotyping has demonstrated significant value well 
beyond the obvious expectations of the program by opening many new 
doors of opportunity that were previously not accessible.” 
 
   Gianfranco Pezzino, MD, MPH 
   State Epidemiologist 




3. Overview of the CDC Tuberculosis Genotyping Program 
Two genotyping laboratories, one in Michigan and one in California, are under contract 
with CDC to provide genotyping services to TB programs in the United States. TB programs 
that have been approved to participate in the CDC Tuberculosis Genotyping Program may 
submit to a genotyping laboratory one isolate from each culture-positive patient with TB 
within their jurisdictions. In rare circumstances, TB programs may submit additional isolates 
from the same patient. These circumstances are described in Chapter 5, Developing a TB 
Genotyping Program. The genotyping laboratories will analyze isolates from current patients, 
but TB programs may request permission to submit selected isolates collected in the past. 
Although the implementation of universal genotyping (i.e., submitting one isolate from every 
culture-positive patient with TB) has substantial benefits, a TB program does not have to 
submit a particular number or percentage of isolates to participate in the program. 
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The genotyping laboratories will use three genotyping methods: spoligotyping, 
mycobacterial interspersed repetitive units (MIRU) analysis, and IS6110-based restriction 
fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) analysis. Spoligotyping and MIRU analysis are based 
on the polymerase chain reaction (PCR). Together, these methods will be referred to as PCR 
genotyping tests. The genotyping laboratories will analyze all the submitted isolates by both 
PCR genotyping tests. Under certain circumstances and upon the request of the TB program, 
isolates that have matching genotypes by both spoligotyping and MIRU analysis can be tested 
by RFLP analysis. Genotyping results, under most circumstances, will be reported to the TB 
program but not to the submitting laboratories. The genotyping services are free to TB 
programs, but neither CDC nor the genotyping laboratories will pay the packaging and 
shipping costs. 
4. TB Program Eligibility and Application Procedures 
All of the 68 TB programs in the United States that have cooperative agreements with 
CDC are eligible to apply to participate in the CDC Tuberculosis Genotyping Program. The 
following are the steps that are required to make an application: 
• Read this guide to become familiar with the CDC Tuberculosis Genotyping Program. 
• Complete the application form available on the TB WebBoard at http://web-
tb.forum.cdc.gov.   
• Send the application to the CDC Tuberculosis Genotyping Program by facsimile (fax) at 
404-639-8959. 
 
Applications will be reviewed to ensure that important steps described in this guide have 
been considered by applicants. If you have questions about completing your application, 
contact Dr. Thomas Navin at TNavin@cdc.gov or the CDC program consultant for your area. 
If you have laboratory questions, contact Dr. Jack Crawford at JCrawford@cdc.gov. 
When your application is approved, you will be informed where (i.e., which genotyping 
laboratory) to submit your isolates. You can download needed forms (e.g., the TB Genotyping 
Isolate Submission Form) from the WebBoard at http://web-tb.forum.cdc.gov under the folder 
titled TB Genotyping.  
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Tuberculosis Genotyping Case Studies: 
How TB Programs Have Used Genotyping 
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1. Investigation of a Genotyping Cluster in a Low-Incidence State 
2. Apparent Genotyping Cluster among Recent Immigrants from the 
Philippines 
3. False-Positive Culture Investigation 
4. Algorithm to Detect False-Positive Cultures 
5. A Misdiagnosis that was Identified with Genotyping  
6. Genotyping Used to Improve Contact and Cluster Investigations  
7. Identification of Nontraditional Transmission Settings 
8. Investigation of a Multistate Tuberculosis Outbreak 
9. Homeless Shelter Outbreak Investigation 
10. Using Genotyping to Evaluate the Impact of a Screening Program  
 
In this chapter, we will provide examples of how TB programs have used genotyping to 
assist them in conducting important TB control activities. Specifically, this chapter provides 
examples of how genotyping results have helped identify new, previously unrecognized 
transmission links between patients with TB, how they have been used effectively during 
outbreak investigations, and how these results can be used in the future to detect outbreaks at 
early stages. We will also describe how genotyping has been used to monitor epidemiologic 
trends, evaluate program performance, and identify instances of false-positive cultures that can 
result from mislabeling clinical specimens, cross-contamination of cultures, or other problems. 
In the past, most programs have submitted only selected M. tuberculosis isolates for 
genotyping. Although selective genotyping provides new insights into TB transmission, the 
power of genotyping is increased considerably when isolates from all patients with culture-
positive TB are genotyped, even before contact investigations or outbreak investigations raise 
the suspicion that there might be a link between patients. In reading the case studies that 
follow, pay attention to what advantages accrue to programs that institute selective genotyping 
and what advantages accrue only to programs that institute universal genotyping. 
Most of the data that has been gathered about the utility of TB genotyping is based on the 
genotyping approach used by the TB programs that participated in the National Tuberculosis 
Genotyping and Surveillance Network (NTGSN) (Castro 2002). A special issue of the journal 
Emerging Infectious Diseases was devoted to presenting the findings of the NTGSN study and 
is available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol8no11/contents_v8n11.htm. 
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The NTGSN study was based on IS6110-based RFLP analysis supplemented by 
spoligotyping for certain isolates. Data are still limited about how this past approach will 
compare with the current approach used by the CDC Tuberculosis Genotyping Program, which 
is based on spoligotyping and MIRU analysis of all isolates, with IS6110-based RFLP for only 
selected isolates (see Chapter 5, Developing a Tuberculosis Genotyping Program, for details 
about when RFLP is helpful). The first three of the following examples were reported by TB 
programs that are using the current approach; the others come from the National Tuberculosis 
Genotyping and Surveillance Network. 
1. Investigation of a Genotyping Cluster in a Low-Incidence State 
Universal genotyping using spoligotyping and MIRU analysis was implemented in 
Wisconsin in 2001 as part of a CDC-sponsored research project to study the impact of 
genotyping in states with low TB rates. The following case study illustrates how the Wisconsin 
TB control program used genotyping results, demographic data, results of contact 
investigations, and a follow-up cluster investigation with the patients to identify a previously 
unrecognized cluster of cases involved in the same chain of recent transmission. 
Six patients were identified whose M. tuberculosis isolates all had an identical 
spoligotype and MIRU type. On the basis of these results, the genotyping laboratory assigned 
each isolate the same PCR cluster designation (Both the spoligotype and MIRU analysis are 
based on PCR, and together they are referred to as PCR-based genotyping tests—isolates that 
have matching spoligotypes and MIRU types are automatically assigned the same PCR cluster 
designation.) 
The TB program staff reviewed data from previous interviews with the six patients and 
recognized that they were predominantly middle-aged, U.S.-born, non-Hispanic black males 
who lived in close proximity to each other; three patients admitted to excessive use of alcohol 
and drugs. Based on this information, the staff concluded that these six TB patients had 
possible epidemiologic links and, therefore, the genotyping cluster could represent ongoing 
transmission (see Chapter 4, Combining Genotyping Results and Epidemiologic Data to 
Improve Our Understanding of Tuberculosis Transmission, for definitions of epidemiologic 
links). 
The TB program requested that the genotyping laboratory perform IS6110-based RFLP 
analysis on the six isolates to confirm the matching spoligotype and MIRU results. The RFLP 
analysis revealed a matching 9-band pattern, and, on the basis of this additional data, the 
genotyping laboratory assigned each isolate the same PCR/IS6110 cluster designation. 
The TB program now had stronger (but still not confirmatory) evidence that the six 
patients were involved in the same chain of recent transmission, so they conducted a cluster 
investigation to determine if the possible epidemiologic links between the patients that they 
had detected could be confirmed. 
Five patients were interviewed again (one patient was deceased); however this time, 
greater detail was extracted about where they spent time and with whom (over the previous 5 
years in some cases). The cluster investigation was worthwhile, as it revealed known 
epidemiologic links between the six patients. The cluster investigation also identified five 
high-risk sites (a single room occupancy hotel, two homeless shelters, a crack house, and a 
bar), where TB transmission could have occurred. Patient interviews revealed three additional 
cluster-related patients who had matching genotypes and similar epidemiologic links to the 
other clustered patients.  
TB screening at one of the homeless shelters and at a crack house was conducted. The 
city of Milwaukee is in the process of investigating current screening practices at homeless 
shelters and is providing TB-related education to health-care providers in the community to 
help them recognize and treat suspected TB patients promptly.  
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2. Apparent Genotyping Cluster Among Recent Immigrants from the 
Philippines: IS6110-based RFLP Needed to Discriminate Between 
Isolates Belonging to the Manila Strain 
Previous results from the National Tuberculosis Genotyping and Surveillance Network 
and other studies showed that spoligotyping alone was not particularly helpful in 
distinguishing between isolates that belonged to a group generally referred to as the Beijing 
family of M. tuberculosis isolates. Data from CDC suggest that MIRU analysis, especially 
when combined with RFLP analysis, will be more discriminatory than spoligotyping alone. At 
the same time, we are beginning to see new genotyping families that contain isolates that are 
often not distinguished by spoligotyping plus MIRU analysis. The following case study 
describes patients with isolates from one such family, which has been named the Manila strain 
family because of its predominance in patients from Manila. 
During 2000--2003, isolates from seven patients were identified as belonging to the same 
PCR cluster (i.e., each isolate had the same spoligotype and MIRU type). On the basis of the 
spoligotype and MIRU type, the CDC recognized that these isolates belonged to the Manila 
family. Analysis of data from the initial case-patient interviews revealed that they were all 
recent immigrants from the Philippines, but they lived in different regions of Wisconsin. The 
contact investigations of the cases did not reveal epidemiologic links between any of the 
patients. 
Because no epidemiologic links were identified for these PCR-clustered cases, the TB 
program requested that the seven isolates be analyzed by RFLP, which revealed seven distinct 
patterns. Therefore, despite identical spoligotypes and MIRU types, these seven isolates were 
shown to be genetically distinct by RFLP analysis. The TB program did not undertake a cluster 
investigation, since the seven isolates were shown not to belong to the same genotyping 
cluster. 
3. False-Positive Culture Investigation 
In early 2003, a state mycobacteriology laboratory began testing the Mycobacterium 
Growth Indicator Tube (MGIT) 960 system as a potential replacement for their current 
BACTEC 460 system for culture of M. tuberculosis in broth media. The MGIT 960 is an 
automated culture system that automatically checks culture tubes for growth every hour and 
does not depend on a technician reviewing culture results twice each week, as was required by 
the former system. During February and March 2003, the BACTEC and the MGIT systems 
were used in parallel.  
In March 2003, several M. tuberculosis isolates cultured in the state laboratory were 
reported to be resistant to isoniazid (INH) and streptomycin. In April 2003, several isolates 
also demonstrated resistance to isoniazid (INH) and ethambutol. Since these susceptibility 
patterns are unusual, the concern for possible false-positive culture results was raised and a 
formal investigation was initiated. 
Spoligotyping and MIRU analysis identified three separate genotyping clusters during 
this time period. The first cluster consisted of two isolates with isoniazid and streptomycin 
resistance. One of the isolates came from a patient with three positive cultures and an abnormal 
chest x-ray; the other came from a patient with only one positive culture and a history of blunt 
trauma to the chest. This patient’s specimen was processed 1 day after the first patient’s 
specimen was processed for drug susceptibility testing. 
The second cluster involved isolates from six patients, each with only one positive 
culture. Only one patient had a clinical picture suggestive of tuberculosis, and this patient was 
in his 11th month of anti-TB treatment administered by directly observed therapy. The 
spoligotyping and MIRU results from these six isolates matched a quality-control strain used 
by the laboratory. In each instance, patient specimens were processed for drug susceptibility 
testing within 1-2 days of the quality-control strain. 
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The third cluster involved only one patient. This patient had only one positive culture 
result and had a clinical picture that was not particularly suggestive of tuberculosis disease. 
This patient’s isolate matched the genotyping pattern of a proficiency strain the laboratory 
processed 1 day before during drug susceptibility testing. 
A review of laboratory procedures revealed that new laboratory protocols were required 
for use of the MGIT system. These protocols stipulated that a manual micropipettor should be 
used to inoculate tubes for drug susceptibility testing and for adding sterile supplement to broth 
tubes for culture of new specimens. Additional micropipettors had been ordered, but they had 
not arrived yet at the time of the contamination. Therefore, the same manual micropipettor was 
used to inoculate tubes for DST each afternoon and to add sterile supplement to broth tubes 
each morning. These broth tubes were subsequently inoculated with incoming 
specimens/isolates via sterile, disposable pipettes. 
This investigation highlights several common findings when false-positive cultures occur. 
All of the patients with false-positive cultures had only one positive culture result (all the true 
cases had more than one positive culture result). All of the patients with false-positive culture 
results did not have clinical pictures that were particularly suggestive of active tuberculosis, 
and in all cases, the contaminated cultures and the cultures that were the sources of the 
contamination were processed within 1-2 days of each other. Genotyping helped the laboratory 
staff and clinicians communicate rapidly and terminate unnecessary treatment.  
As you will see when we discuss algorithms for identifying possible false-positive culture 
results, each of these findings are red flags and should be evaluated each time a genotyping 
cluster is reported. 
4. Algorithm to Detect False-Positive Cultures 
Genotyping can help identify instances of incorrect TB diagnoses that are based on false-
positive cultures. Incorrect diagnoses can result from laboratory cross-contamination of 
cultures, mislabeling of patient specimens, collection errors, and reporting errors. Such errors 
occur in an estimated 1%–3% of all reported cases of TB, and as many as 300 persons per year 
in the United States may be started erroneously on anti-tuberculosis treatment. Universal 
genotyping permits TB programs to establish simple algorithms to flag suspected errors. 
The California Department of Health Services, in collaboration with San Francisco 
General Hospital, Santa Clara Valley Medical Center, and Solano County Public Health 
Laboratory, evaluated this type of algorithm to find methods to decrease the occurrence of 
laboratory cross-contamination (Jasmer 2002).  
During the study period from January 1998 through June 1999, cultures for 296 patients 
were positive for M. tuberculosis, and cultures for ten patients met one or more of the criteria 
for possible false-positive cultures. A review by a panel of experts determined that TB was 
misdiagnosed for six patients (representing 2% of all patients with cultures positive for M. 
tuberculosis) because of laboratory cross-contamination. In four of the six cases, 
contamination probably occurred when reagents were dispensed from a common flask. This 
practice was discontinued on the basis of the findings of this study. (See Chapter 6, Applying 
Genotyping Results to Tuberculosis Control Practices, for more information on investigating 
false-positive cultures.)  
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5. A Misdiagnosis that Was Identified with Genotyping  
A 36-year-old woman came to the emergency room with a 2-day history of fevers, cough, 
and right-sided pleuritic chest pain. She had no known history of tuberculosis exposure. Her 
past medical history was notable for injection drug use (heroin) up to the time of her 
admission. Her physical examination showed a fever of 39ºC and signs of consolidation at the 
right lung base. A chest radiograph showed right lower lobe infiltrates with an associated small 
pleural effusion. The patient was admitted to respiratory isolation and treated with intravenous 
ceftriaxone. She responded quickly and became afebrile after 2 days of therapy. A standard 
sputum culture grew normal oral flora; blood culture results were negative. Three sputum 
specimens were acid-fast bacilli (AFB) smear-negative, but she had a 15-mm response to 
tuberculin skin testing (TST). A human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) test was negative. She 
was discharged to complete 7 days of therapy with amoxicillin for community-acquired 
pneumonia.  
She was called back to the TB Clinic 1 month after discharge when one of the three 
sputum specimens grew drug-susceptible M. tuberculosis, and she was given a diagnosis of 
tuberculosis. By that time she reported feeling back to normal, and a repeat chest radiograph 
was normal. Two additional sputum specimens were collected and were AFB smear- and 
eventually culture-negative. She was treated with isoniazid (INH), rifampin, pyrazinamide, and 
ethambutol for 2 months and then with isoniazid and rifampin for 4 additional months. The TB 
control program also performed a relatively large contact investigation. Two years later, during 
a study in which all M. tuberculosis isolates underwent genotyping, her isolate was found to 
match that of a specimen from a laboratory proficiency test specimen that underwent initial 
processing on the same day. 
This case has several characteristic features of a false-positive culture result. First, and 
most importantly, the clinical case was atypical for tuberculosis with an acute onset and rapid 
resolution with antibiotic therapy having no activity against mycobacteria. Although the 
patient had latent tuberculosis (the positive tuberculin skin test), the fact that the infiltrate 
completely resolved within 1 month, essentially without anti-tuberculosis therapy, is not 
consistent with tuberculosis. Second, only one of several specimens grew M. tuberculosis (a 
single-positive culture result). Routine review of single-positive culture results is one method 
to detect potential false-positive cultures. Treating this patient for TB required the TB program 
to use valuable resources and exposed the patient to the toxicity of unnecessary multidrug 
therapy. 
6. Genotyping Used to Improve Contact and Cluster Investigations 
The Massachusetts Department of Public Health recently reported on their universal 
genotyping program and provided evidence that genotyping strengthened both their contact 




From 1996 through 2000, Massachusetts used routine contact investigations to identify 
92 epidemiologic links between 984 persons with TB. Subsequent genotyping results with 
IS6110-based RFLP and spoligotyping confirmed that 67 (73%) of these had matching 
genotype patterns. In 25 (27%), however, the reported epidemiologic links were not supported 
by matching genotyping results. The reported relationships or locations of transmission that 
were revealed by genotyping to be misleading are shown in Table 2.1. In addition to 
identifying misleading epidemiologic links, the Massachusetts program used universal 
genotyping and subsequent cluster investigations to identify 21 patients who shared 
genotyping matches and epidemiologic links that were not found by routine contact 
investigations (Table 2.2). The settings of transmission for these unexpected epidemiologic 
links were often nontraditional, and at least one cluster consisting of three patients was the 
result of casual transmission. The routine contact investigations found nothing in common 
among the three, but the subsequent cluster investigation established that one patient had been 
the hairdresser of the second patient, who spent time in a college dormitory where the third 
patient was a security guard.  
 
 
Table 2.1.  Relationship or location of presumed transmission for 25 patients with suspected 
epidemiologic links detected during contact investigations that were not confirmed by subsequent 
genotyping results --- Massachusetts, 1996--2000. 
Suspected relationship/location of 
transmission Number of misleading epidemiologic links  
Homeless shelter 11 
Household members 5 
Workplace 4 
Friends/social contacts 3 
Non-household family members 2 
Total 25 
Table 2.2. Newly recognized transmission settings detected by cluster investigations, Massachusetts. 
Newly recognized transmission setting Number of TB patients with newly discovered epidemiologic links 
Hair salon, college building 3  
Bar 2  
Public housing 2  
Prison 2  
Long-term care facility 2  
Fast food restaurant 2  
Buddhist temple 2  
Community barbecue 2  
Neighborhood market 2  
Neighborhood 2  
Total 21
 






7. Identification of Nontraditional Transmission Settings 
The Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene described how universal 
genotyping can strengthen traditional TB control efforts. Maryland genotyped all of its M. 
tuberculosis isolates received during 1996 to 2000 and recently published the results (Cronin 
2002).  
Of 1,172 patients with genotyping results, genotypes from 436 matched those of at least 
one other patient in the state. Of the 436 clustered patients, 115 were thought to have acquired 
TB recently, and in 114 a setting of presumed transmission could be identified. Before the 
genotyping results were known, routine contact investigations identified epidemiologic links 
for 72 of the 114 patients (Table 2.3). During follow-up cluster investigations, additional 
information resulted in the identification of 42 patients with additional epidemiologic links. 
Maryland’s cluster investigations, which were conducted after the genotyping results 
were available, helped to identify 30% more epidemiologic links than the original contact 
investigations. Many of these newly discovered epidemiologic links suggested that TB 
transmission occurred in settings that are often not asked about in routine contact 
investigations (e.g., homeless shelters, bars, churches, and nursing homes). The new 
information led TB program staff to screen previously unsuspected groups of persons. 
 
 
“Universal genotyping has proved to be an invaluable tool for the Massachusetts TB 
Division. Data provided through this mechanism has driven our strategic planning 
process. Not only can we better understand transmission trends in our state, we can 
also identify cross contamination more quickly as well as prove (or disprove) cases 
that appear to be related. It is also a key core element of our Outbreak/ High Profile 
Incident Response Plan and we have used it as a tool for recent outbreaks among 
the homeless, and a cluster of Somalian cases. It is hard to imagine now, a TB 
Program without genotyping.” 
 
   Sue Etkind, RN, MS  
   Director 
   TB Prevention and Control 









8. Investigation of a Multistate Tuberculosis Outbreak:  The Importance of 
Comparing Genotype Results Between Adjacent TB Programs 
From June 1998 through June 1999, 15 young African-Americans from Baltimore, 
Maryland and New York City developed TB with isolates that had a matching RFLP pattern 
(McElroy 2002). All but one of the patients were members of the transgender community and 
belonged to a social organization that regularly met to dance and participate in dressing 
competitions known as “balls.”   
Since members of this social organization traveled widely, health officials were 
concerned that transmission of this outbreak strain could be occurring in other cities. To search 
for additional patients whose isolates might match the outbreak genotype, the investigators 
took advantage of the National Tuberculosis Genotyping and Surveillance Network database, 
which contains over 6,000 unique RFLP images. This search revealed four previously 
unrecognized matches—three were found to be close contacts of a transgender person who was 
involved in the outbreak (one lived in the same house, one worked at the same location, and 
Table 2.3.  Transmission settings or relationships identified by either routine contact investigations or by 
cluster investigations for 114 patients with recently acquired tuberculosis --- Maryland, 1996--2000. 
Transmission 








only by cluster 
investigation (%) 
Traditional 
   Household 28  25 (  89)   3 (  11) 
   Close relative 13 13 (100)   0 
   Close friend 17 11 (  65)   6 (  35) 
   Total traditional 58 49 (  84)   9 (  16) 
    
Nontraditional*    
   Hospital 10   5 (  50)   5 (  50) 
   Other workplace   6   6 (100)   0 
   Social club 11   7 (  64)   4 (  36) 
   Homeless shelter   5   0   5 (100) 
   Bar 10   1 (  10)   9 (  90) 
   Prison or jail   5   3  ( 60)   2 (  40) 
   Store   2   0   2 (100) 
   Church   2   0   2 (100) 
   Nursing home   2   0   2 (100) 
   School   1   0   1 (100) 
   Ship   1   1 (100)   0 
   Mortuary   1   0   1 (100) 
   Total nontraditional 56 23 (  41) 33 (  59) 
* The definition of nontraditional settings of transmission used by Maryland is not identical to the one used  
   in Table 4.2. 
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the third worked as a custodian on the same floor as the patient). The fourth patient with a 
matching genotype, a 42-year-old man, died before he could be interviewed. 
Additional isolates for genotyping were obtained from laboratories in New York City, 
Atlanta, and Philadelphia by searching existing TB records for patients that fit the outbreak 
profile. This search came up with eight additional patients, all from New York City, with 
isolates matching the outbreak strain. Interviews revealed that all but one were part of the same 
transgender social group. During the investigation, five additional patients who had 
epidemiologic links to the original outbreak-associated patients, developed TB, and the 
genotypes of their isolates matched the outbreak strain (Figure 2.1). Another patient, a 7-year-
old girl, developed clinical TB but never had a positive culture result. Although no isolate was 
available to prove that she was infected with the outbreak strain, this is likely, since she 
became ill while living with her sister, one of the outbreak patients. This outbreak investigation 






























Figure 2.1.  Epidemic curve of investigation of a multistate TB outbreak among transgender persons 
involving cases from New Jersey, Maryland, New York City, and Baltimore. A search of the National 
Tuberculosis Genotyping and Surveillance Network genotyping database led to the identification of four 
additional outbreak-related cases (McElroy 2002). 
 
9. Homeless Shelter Outbreak Investigation: Universal Genotyping Can 
Help in the Early Identification of Outbreaks 
In April 2000, staff members of Wake County Human Services in North Carolina became 
concerned about a recent increase in reports of TB in men at a Raleigh homeless shelter. An 
extensive investigation lasted several months and included the screening of 620 shelter 
residents and 26 employees. Initially, the investigation established that a) an outbreak probably 
was occurring, b) many of the affected persons were HIV-infected, and c) transmission 
probably was centered at a single homeless shelter in Raleigh (McElroy 2003). 
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Subsequently, the investigators conducted a careful record review and genotyped isolates 
from all 72 Wake County patients who had culture-confirmed TB from January 1998 through 
April 2002. The genotyping results showed that the outbreak-associated genotyping cluster 
consisted of 25 patients. As shown in the epidemic curve, if universal genotyping had been in 
place at the time this outbreak began, the outbreak might have been recognized as early as 
August 1999, rather than in April of the following year (Figure 2.2). If aggressive control 
measures had been instituted in August 1999, TB in many of the 18 subsequent patients, most 




















































































































Figure 2.2.  Epidemic curve of cases investigated during an outbreak at a homeless shelter in North 
Carolina. If universal genotyping had been available before the outbreak, it might have been recognized as 
in August 1999 or even before and subsequent cases might have been prevented (McElory 2003). 
 
 
10. Using Genotyping to Evaluate the Impact of a Screening Program  
The staff of Denver Metro TB Clinic, Denver Public Health Department used genotyping 
results to evaluate their skin test and symptom screening program among the homeless (Kong 
2002). Previous genotyping results had demonstrated an association between recent TB 
transmission and homelessness. In response, the Clinic developed a screening program for 
homeless persons, which required annual TSTs and chest radiography for tuberculin reactors 
or those with symptoms of tuberculosis. This intervention boosted estimated skin-testing 
coverage from 27% to 67% among the homeless from 1995 through 1998. Latent TB infection 
treatment completion increased minimally from 19% to 37% in the same time period. 
The Clinic’s screening program was associated with a decrease in the TB rate from 510 
per 100,000 homeless persons in 1995 to 121 in 1998. The estimated proportion of TB cases 
resulting from recent transmission within the homeless population, defined as cases that were 
clustered within the previous 2 years, decreased from 49% (1988–1994) to 14% (1995–1998). 
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2. Description of Genotyping Methods 
3. Submission of Isolates  
4. Genotyping Results, Designation of Clusters, and Reporting 
5. Suspected False-Positive Cultures 
6. IS6110-based RFLP Analysis 
 
 
Two genotyping laboratories have been funded through contracts with CDC to support 
the CDC Tuberculosis Genotyping Program by providing genotyping services to TB programs 
in the United States. TB programs can submit one isolate from each person with culture-
positive tuberculosis within their jurisdictions. The genotyping laboratories will analyze 
isolates from current patients, but TB programs may request permission to submit selected 
isolates collected in the past. Isolates that are thought to be the result of false-positive cultures 
can be submitted, even though they may not result in a reported case. In special circumstances 
described in Chapter 5, Developing a Tuberculosis Genotyping Program, TB programs may 
submit additional isolates from the same patient.  
The genotyping laboratories will use three genotyping methods: spoligotyping, MIRU 
analysis, and IS6110-based RFLP analysis, also known as fingerprinting. Spoligotyping and 
MIRU analysis are based on PCR. Together, these two methods will be referred to as the PCR 
genotyping tests. All submitted isolates will be analyzed by the first two methods; selected 
isolates will be analyzed with RFLP analysis. Descriptions of the technical aspects of these 
three methods were published recently (Barnes 2003). 
Genotyping results will be reported to the TB program but not to the submitting 
laboratories, except when isolates represent suspected false-positive cultures. When the 
submitting laboratory suspects a false-positive culture, genotyping results from these 
submissions will be provided to both the TB program and the submitting laboratory. 
1. Science Behind TB Genotyping  
Genotyping is based on an analysis of DNA. Mycobacteria reproduce by binary fission, 
which means that in almost all cases each new bacillus has identical DNA, just as human 
identical twins are genetically identical to each other. However, changes in the DNA occur 
spontaneously at low frequency. Over time, these changes, known as DNA mutations, have 
accumulated to produce the diversity of M. tuberculosis strains currently circulating in the 
world.  
The diversity of strains provides a means to identify instances of recent transmission of 
TB as well as the chains of transmission that occur among persons with TB. This diversity also 
helps to elucidate the patterns and dynamics of TB transmission. When a person with TB 
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improves but then becomes ill again, this diversity can differentiate reactivation with the same 
strain of M. tuberculosis from reinfection with a different strain. Genotyping can also be used 
to identify false-positive cultures. 
Advances in DNA analytic methods have made it possible for TB programs to obtain 
rapid and reliable genotyping results. These advances include  
• the determination of the complete DNA sequence of M. tuberculosis in 1998; 
• the development of IS6110-based RFLP genotyping, which provided a discriminatory 
typing method and led to a standardized system for genotyping M. tuberculosis isolates; 
and 
• the development of two new methods, spoligotyping and MIRU analysis, which are based 
on PCR and provide much more rapid results than RFLP analysis. 
2. Description of Genotyping Methods 
Spoligotyping 
Spacer oligonucleotide typing is a hybridization assay that detects variability in the direct 
repeat (DR) region in the DNA of M. tuberculosis. The DR region consists of multiple copies 
of a conserved 36-base-pair sequence (the direct repeats) separated by multiple unique spacer 
sequences (the standard spoligotyping assay uses 43). Different M. tuberculosis strains have 
various complements of the 43 spacers, and these different complements form the basis of the 
assay (Kamerbeek 1997). 
The standard spoligotyping assay is performed by using a membrane. In this format, each 
of the 43 spacers produces either a dark band (indicating the presence of the spacer) or no band 
(indicating the spacer’s absence). As Figure 3.1 shows, for each M. tuberculosis isolate, the 
spoligotyping assay produces a series of bands, much like a bar code. 
 
7     7    7     7    7     7    4     7    7     7    6    0   7    7   1
7     7     7    3     7    7     3     4    7    7     6     0 4    0   0
111-111-111-111-111-111-100-111-111-111-110-000-111-111-1
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Original banding pattern
Binary code
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Octal designation     




Figure 3.1.  Two examples of spoligotype results showing the original banding patterns as well as the steps 
involved in converting the banding pattern results to the final octal code designation. The octal designation 
is the form of the result that is reported by the genotyping laboratories to TB programs. 
CDC Tuberculosis Genotyping Laboratory Procedures 
17 
To simplify recording, the band pattern is converted to a series of 1s and 0s (1 means that 
the band is present and 0 means it is absent—see the rows labeled Binary code in Figure 3.1) 
that is 43 digits long. Since there are only 1s and 0s in the number, this is called a binary code. 
To simplify this even further, the 43-digit binary code is converted to a 15-digit octal (i.e., base 
8, having the digits 0-7) designation by a two-step process. First, the 43-digit binary code is 
divided into 14 sets of three digits (spacers 1 through 42) plus one additional digit (spacer 43). 
Second, each 3-digit binary set is converted to its octal equivalent, with the final additional 
digit remaining as 1 or 0. The translation of binary numbers to octal numbers is done as 
follows: 000 = 0; 001 = 1; 010 = 2; 011 = 3; 100 = 4; 101 = 5; 110 = 6; 111 = 7. Each octal 
designation is unique, representing one specific banding pattern. From an octal designation, the 
binary code of the spoligotyping pattern can be re-created. A spreadsheet application, such as 
Microsoft Excel, can be used to perform the conversion from binary to octal and from octal to 
binary. 
The genotyping laboratories will use a new, automated spoligotyping assay that produces 
numeric values for each spacer rather than a photographic image. The results are automatically 
converted to 43-digit binary codes, which are then converted to 15-digit octal designations, as 
described above. These octal designations can be compared with published results obtained 
with the previously used assay.  
This coding and reporting information is given to help explain how the process works. 
The bottom line is much simpler: the genotyping laboratories will report spoligotyping results 
to TB programs by giving the octal code designation for each isolate. If one isolate’s 
spoligotype designation is different from another isolate’s designation, even by a single 
number, that means the two isolates’ spoligotypes are different. 
Figure 3.2 shows examples of spoligotype patterns for several known strains. Most M. 
tuberculosis strains, such as H37Rv, lack spacers 33-36. Generally, Mycobacterium bovis 
strains, such as BCG, have all four spacers 33 through 36 and lack spacers 39 through 43. All 
Beijing family isolates lack spacers 1 through 34, and this is the key indicator of the family. 
Beijing isolates are common in the United States; therefore, the finding that two persons both 
are infected with isolates that share the Beijing spoligotype (octal designation: 
000000000003771) is not a reliable indication that the two persons are involved in the same 
chain of TB transmission. A second common spoligotype in the United States is 
777777777760771 (lacking only spacers 33 through 36). Again, this spoligotype is so common 
that it is not a good indicator that the two isolates are related. Spacers can be lost either singly 
or in groups of consecutive spacers. The next three patterns in Figure 3.2 show examples of the 
types of changes that can occur. Pattern A can go to pattern B or C; either B or C can go to D 
via a second event. However, B cannot go to C or C to B because missing spacers cannot be 
regained. Some understanding of the relationship of the spoligotype patterns and octal 













Figure 3.2. Graphical representations of spoligotype patterns of certain strains. Strains H37Rv and BCG 
are used as control strains in the assay and between them contain all 43 spacers. The Beijing spoligotype 
contains only the final nine spacers (35 through 43). The octal designations for the patterns are H37Rv, 
777777477760771; BCG, 676773777777600; Beijing, 000000000003771; S2, 777777777760771; A, 




Variable number of tandem repeat (VNTR) typing is based on analysis of DNA segments 
containing “tandem repeated” sequences in which the number of copies of the repeated 
sequence varies among strains. The method relies on PCR amplification and calculation of the 
number of repeats on the basis of the size of the amplified product. MIRUs are a class of 
tandem repeated sequences. There are a total of 41 MIRU loci, of which 12 have been selected 
for genotyping. The names of the 12 loci that will be analyzed are 02, 04, 10, 16, 20, 23, 24, 
26, 27, 31, 39, and 40 (Mazars 2001). 
MIRU results are reported as 12-character designations, each character corresponding to 
the number of repeats at one of the 12 MIRU loci, listed in a standard order (Table 3.1). In rare 
instances, the number of repeats is greater than 9. To avoid the use of double digits, the 
following designations are used in reporting results: 10 repeats = “a”; 11 repeats = “b”; 12 
repeats = “c”; etc. Occasionally, the repeat number is 0. If the region is deleted and no 
amplification product is obtained, this is indicated by a dash (-). A few strains give an 
anomalous result for MIRU locus number 04 (i.e., the second digit in the MIRU type). These 
anomalous results at 04 are designated “x,” “y,” or “z,” depending on the number of repeats.  
 
Table 3.1.  Examples of MIRU results.  MIRU results are reported as a 12-digit designation, with each digit 
representing the number of repeats detected at the respective 12 MIRU loci. For loci with more than nine 
repeats, letters are used (e.g., “a” for 10 repeats, “b” for 11, etc.). See text for details. 
Example 1 
MIRU locus name 02 04 10 16 20 23 24 26 27 31 39 40 
No. of repeats 2 3 2 2 3 4 2 5 3 3 2 2 
MIRU designation      232234253322 
Example 2 
MIRU locus name 02 04 10 16 20 23 24 26 27 31 39 40 
No. of repeats 1 4 3 2 2 4 0 4 3 5 4 11 
MIRU designation      14322404354b 
 
IS6110-based Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) 
IS6110-based RFLP genotyping detects variations generated by the insertion element 
IS6110. Insertion elements are capable of making copies of themselves and then inserting the 
copy anywhere in the genome in a process known as transposition. Strains can differ in both 
the number of copies of IS6110 and the positions of IS6110 in the bacterial DNA (van Embden 
1993). 
IS6110-based RFLP is performed by using an internationally standardized protocol. The 
first step is purification of DNA from a culture of M. tuberculosis. A restriction enzyme is 
added that cuts the DNA at specific sequences into hundreds of different fragments. The 
fragments are separated by size on an agarose gel and transferred to a membrane. A probe is 
used to detect fragments containing IS6110, and the image is captured on film. Each copy of 
IS6110 produces one band. RFLP patterns containing seven or more bands provide more 
specificity in discriminating between isolates. Patterns with six or fewer bands provide 
correspondingly less discrimination. A very small percentage of M. tuberculosis isolates, 
especially those from India and Southeast Asia, lack IS6110; RFLP analysis of such isolates 
results in a blank fingerprint with no bands.  
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Unlike spoligotyping and MIRU analysis, both of which produce results that can easily 
be translated into a specific numbered designation, IS6110-based RFLP produces a complex 
pattern that cannot be given a straightforward, mathematically derived designation. This 
limitation is not a problem in comparing two RFLP patterns that have been run in the same 
laboratory at the same time on the same gel, since the two patterns can be compared visually. 
Describing the RFLP pattern is a challenge, however, when a laboratory reports an individual 
result to a TB program, when a large number of results need to be stored for future reference, 
or when two laboratories need to compare their RFLP results. Overcoming this technical 
challenge requires a sophisticated pattern-matching computer program. The RFLP images on 
film are scanned and digitized for computer analysis. The sizes of the bands in the image are 
calculated by comparison with size standards run on the gel. The computer program compares 
the results from a new isolate with previously analyzed isolates to determine if any matches 
exist. Figure 3.3 illustrates examples of IS6110-based RFLP patterns. 
1   2 3 4    5   6 7 8   9  10 11 S
 
Figure 3.3. Representative IS6110-based RFLP image. Isolates represented by lanes 3, 5, 6, 9, and 10 
have the same pattern and were epidemiologically linked. Lane S shows the CDC molecular weight 
standard. 
IS6110-based RFLP requires much more isolate material than do the PCR-based tests to 
yield sufficient DNA for analysis. This requires the genotyping laboratories to place the 
isolates in culture medium and wait until sufficient growth has taken place. Unlike the PCR 
methods (MIRU and spoligotyping), RFLP analysis cannot be done on nonviable cultures. 
Isolation of DNA is laborious, there is a high failure rate, and the procedure often must be 
repeated. It is common for 10%–25% of the DNA samples to be unusable. The complexities of 
the procedure may result in lengthy delays in reporting. 
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3. Submission of Isolates 
TB Genotyping Isolate Submission Form  
The submitting laboratory will be responsible for completing the TB Genotyping Isolate 
Submission Form when they submit isolates to the genotyping laboratory. An electronic copy 
of this Excel spreadsheet form is available for downloading from the TB WebBoard at 
http://web-tb.forum.cdc.gov. 
It is absolutely critical that TB programs and laboratories NOT change in any way the 
column headings of the Isolate Submission form spreadsheet. Any change in the column 
headings will result in data being lost. 
The spreadsheet contains three optional columns (the column headings are “option_1”, 
“option_2” and “option_3”), which the TB programs can use  to record any information they 
want, but they must not change the column headings for these fields either. For example, the 
column labeled as “option_1” could be used to record the zip code of patients, but the heading 
must remain “option_1” on the submitted form. Any optional columns that the program does 
not want to use can be deleted, and the order of the columns on the form can be changed to suit 
the program. 
Guidelines for Submission 
The TB Genotyping Isolate Submission Form is an Excel spreadsheet, and laboratories 
that can use Excel should enter the isolate information directly onto the spreadsheet. One 
spreadsheet line should be used for each isolate. List all of the isolates that will be shipped in 
one container on one spreadsheet; print and insert a copy of the spreadsheet into the container. 
In addition to mailing a hard copy of the spreadsheet with the isolates, send a copy of the Excel 
spreadsheet as an e-mail attachment to the genotyping laboratory. Send a courtesy copy to the 
state TB program for matching with the TB program’s list of new cases and with later 
genotyping results. Patient confidentiality must be protected, but sufficient patient 
identification data are needed to allow this reconciliation to occur without error. 
Special procedures will be required for submitting laboratories that do not have access to 
Excel. They should 
• enter the required information onto a sheet of paper, using a separate sheet for each 
patient and 
• mail these pages and a packing list of all the isolate identification numbers with the 
isolates.  
Submitting laboratories that can use Excel but cannot e-mail Excel attachments should 
print out hard copies of the Excel spreadsheet and mail them to the genotyping laboratory. 
Upon receipt of the isolates, the genotyping laboratory will match the isolates that arrive 
in the shipment with the printed copy of the spreadsheet that accompanies the shipment. If all 
of the isolates are accounted for, the genotyping laboratory will acknowledge receipt to the 
submitting laboratory by e-mail; a courtesy copy will be sent to the TB program. For 
submitting laboratories that cannot receive acknowledgement by e-mail, the genotyping 
laboratory will mail a hard copy acknowledgement. Isolates will be assigned genotyping 
laboratory accession numbers that will include the year, consecutive numbers, and a letter code 
that represents the genotyping laboratory identification designation. 
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Material for Isolate Submission 
Because only small amounts of culture material are required for the PCR-based typing 
methods, submitting laboratories should prepare an isolate for shipment as soon as it is 
identified as M. tuberculosis complex (including M. bovis and Mycobacterium africanum). 
Portions of the culture material should be placed in 2-ml screw-cap vials, which will provide 
substantial savings in shipping costs. Although the process of subculturing onto Lowenstein-
Jensen (L-J) medium (waiting 3 weeks for visible growth and then shipping the L-J slant) is 
acceptable, it greatly delays turnaround times and substantially increases shipping costs. 
The genotyping laboratory will subculture submitted material for possible IS6110-based 
RFLP typing and long-term storage. Isolates that do not grow on subculture at the genotyping 
laboratory will be typed by spoligotyping and MIRU, and replacements for these non-viable 
isolates will be requested from the submitting laboratory. 
Acceptable Material for Isolate Submission 
• Portions of culture material from solid medium transferred to 2-ml screw-cap vials 
• Samples (0.5-1.0 ml) of broth culture transferred to vials 
• Portions (0.5-1.0 ml) of broth cultures or suspensions prepared for susceptibility testing  
• Suspensions (0.5-1.0 ml) prepared for Accuprobe testing (before lysis) 
• L-J (or other solid medium) slants or bottles (not optimal; see discussion in the previous 
section, Material for Isolate Submission 
 
Unacceptable Material for Isolate Submission 
• Clinical specimens (e.g., sputum, pleural fluid) 
• Sediments from processed clinical samples, regardless of smear or nucleic acid 
amplification positivity 
• Petri plates 
• Cultures not yet identified as M. tuberculosis complex 
• Obviously contaminated or suspected mixed cultures  
Shipping Guidelines 
• Each sample must be labeled clearly with a patient identifier, and the same patient 
identifier must be listed on the TB Genotyping Isolate Submission Form.  
• Liquid samples should be shipped in plastic screw-cap tubes with o-rings. The tubes 
should be surrounded by absorbent material.  
• Containers and labels must comply with all regulations of the U.S. Department of 
Transportation and the International Air Transport Association for shipment of infectious 
material.  
• Shipping personnel should have completed required training.  
• See Information on Packaging and Shipping Infectious Substances in Appendix B, under 
Useful Resources, for additional information. 
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4. Genotyping Results, Designation of Clusters, and Reporting 
Turnaround Times of Genotyping Results 
CDC’s contract with the genotyping laboratories requires that the laboratories genotype 
all of the eligible isolates by PCR tests (spoligotyping and MIRU analysis) and report results 
for at least 90% of isolates to the TB programs within 10 working days of receipt of the 
isolates. These rapid turnaround times assume a steady flow of isolates to the laboratory. 
Although we expect that these projected turnaround times will be met most of the time, there 
are several reasons for possible delays. The MIRU automated sequencer is limited to 24 
isolates in each run; if a genotyping laboratory receives large batches at one time, there will be 
a delay in reporting some of the results. Technical difficulties (e.g., instrument failure) may 
also cause delays. 
Under certain circumstances, the TB program can request that the genotyping laboratories 
perform IS6110-based RFLP analysis on isolates that match by both spoligotyping and MIRU 
analysis. See “IS6110-based RFLP Analysis” (Chapter 3, CDC Tuberculosis Genotyping 
Laboratory Procedures) for details about how the genotyping laboratory will report RFLP 
results, and see chapter 5, Developing a Tuberculosis Genotyping Program, for a description 
of circumstances where RFLP analysis is appropriate. CDC’s contract stipulates that the 
genotyping laboratories will report RFLP results for 90% of isolates within 15 working days 
from the date of the RFLP analysis request. 
In almost all instances, these turnaround times are fast enough to ensure that there will be 
no need for TB programs to prioritize requests, even for investigations of outbreaks or false-
positive cultures.  
Designation of Clusters and Reporting 
Automated instruments determine the spoligotype and MIRU type. The results (15-digit 
octal number for spoligotypes and 12-digit number for MIRU types) are imported directly into 
the genotyping laboratory-tracking database. The automated nature of the analyses and 
assignment of numeric results reduces human interpretation and transcription errors. 
The spoligotype and MIRU type will be compared with all other isolates previously 
submitted from the same TB program. The genotyping laboratory will assign a PCR cluster 
designation to isolates that have spoligotypes and MIRU types that match exactly. The PCR 
cluster designation will consist of a two-letter TB program designation followed by a 
consecutively derived three-digit number. For state programs, the two-letter designation will 
be the postal code (e.g., “GA” for Georgia’s state TB program). See Chapter 4, Combining 
Genotyping and Epidemiologic Data to Improve Our Understanding of Tuberculosis 
Transmission, for examples. 
For each new isolate from a specific TB program, the search for matches will yield one of 
three results: 
• No match. This indicates that a search of current and previous isolates from the TB 
program identified no other isolate with a matching PCR genotype. Because the search 
for matches will be restricted to isolates from the TB program, it is possible that a 
matching isolate from another TB program exists in the genotyping laboratory’s database. 
See Chapter 5, Developing a Tuberculosis Genotyping Program, for a discussion of how 
TB programs can compare genotyping results with other TB programs. 
• A match with one current or previous isolate. The genotyping laboratory will assign a 
new genotyping cluster number to this newly identified cluster. 
• A match with more than one isolate from an existing genotyping cluster. The genotyping 
laboratory will assign the existing cluster number to this newly identified addition to an 
existing cluster. 
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When this matching analysis is complete, the results will be sent by e-mail or other 
means to the TB program. At a minimum, the report will list for each isolate the original 
isolate number supplied by the submitting laboratory, the accession number assigned by the 
genotyping laboratory, the report date, the spoligotype and MIRU type, and cluster designation 
(for clustered isolates). For new clusters, the report will list the previous isolate that matches 
the new isolate so that the TB program can update their database. These reports will be 
generated automatically, and each program can specify any other data from the original 
submission form to be included in the report. It is the responsibility of the TB program to 
distribute the genotyping results as they see fit to others in their jurisdiction. 
5. Suspected False-Positive Cultures 
If a submitting laboratory suspects that an isolate represents a false-positive culture, they 
should indicate this suspicion on the TB Genotyping Isolate Submission Form by entering 
“Yes” in the column labeled “Suspected False+.” If the submitting laboratory identifies a 
possible source for the false-positive culture (which could be one of the isolates in the current 
shipment, a previously submitted isolate, or a laboratory control strain), this information 
should be listed in the “Comments” field of the suspected false-positive isolate. In some 
instances, there may be a set of isolates that are suspect. All of these should be indicated by a 
“Yes” in the column labeled “Suspected False+” on the submission spreadsheet. These isolates 
will be genotyped in the usual manner, matched against all isolates from that program, and 
assigned cluster designations.  
The genotyping laboratory will report the results to the TB program as usual. In addition, 
the genotyping laboratory will report the spoligotype and MIRU type and the results of the 
comparison with possible source isolates to the submitting laboratory as “the suspect isolate 
does (or does not) match the possible source isolate(s).” If there is a match, the cluster 
designation will also be reported. The genotyping laboratory will not report the result as 
confirming a false-positive culture. The submitting laboratory, clinician, and TB program must 
make that determination after considering all available information. A standard disclaimer will 
be included stating that genotyping methods are research procedures. 
Because previous episodes of false-positive cultures resulted from cross-contamination 
by the H37Rv/Ra M. tuberculosis control strain, the genotyping laboratory will follow special 
procedures to ensure that cross-contamination by this strain is identified automatically. The 
PCR type for the H37Rv/Ra strain will be included by the genotyping laboratory in the file for 
each program and will be assigned the cluster designation “H37.” If a patient isolate is, in fact, 
the result of cross-contamination with this control strain, the genotyping process will assign it 
the H37 cluster number automatically. This is the only instance when the genotyping 
laboratory will report an isolate as being the result of a possible false-positive culture. 
6. IS6110-based RFLP Analysis 
TB programs can request the genotyping laboratories to perform IS6110-based RFLP 
analysis on isolates that match by both spoligotyping and MIRU analysis. See Chapter 5, 
Developing a Tuberculosis Genotyping Program, for a description of when to request RFLP 
analysis. The request for RFLP analysis must list the cluster number and the specific isolates in 
that cluster to be typed. If additional isolates in the cluster are identified at a later time, the 
program can request IS6110-based RFLP analysis of the additional isolates. 
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Only those isolates listed in the request will be typed by RFLP analysis. RFLP patterns 
will be analyzed for matches or non-matches among the requested isolates. The genotyping 
laboratory will not search the entire database for possible RFLP matches outside the requested 
cluster. Each isolate typed by RFLP analysis will be assigned an RFLP pattern designation 
number. If one of the requested isolates demonstrates an RFLP pattern that does not match the 
patterns of any of the other requested isolates, the isolate will be assigned a new RFLP pattern 
designation number, which will be the genotyping laboratory’s accession number for that 
isolate plus the band number for the RFLP pattern. For isolates with matching RFLP patterns, 
the lowest accession number in that cluster will be assigned to all isolates. Again, the RFLP 
pattern designation number applies only to isolates within a specific PCR cluster (i.e., the same 
spoligotype and MIRU type from the same TB program). Unfortunately, this may result in two 
isolates having the same RFLP pattern but different RFLP pattern designation numbers.  
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4 
Combining Genotyping and Epidemiologic Data to 





2. Reading the Genotyping Laboratory Report 
3. Comparing Genotyping and Epidemiologic Results from Two TB 
Patients 
4. Comparing Genotyping and Epidemiologic Results from Three or 
More TB Patients 
5. Clustering as a Surrogate Measure of Recent Transmission 
 
If two persons develop TB and are reported to the same TB program at about the same 
time, the question arises whether they are involved in the same chain of recent transmission. 
Before genotyping techniques were available, the answer to this question was based on 
whether epidemiologic links could be identified between the two persons that indicated they 
were at the same place at the same time during the period that one of them was infectious or 
whether drug susceptibility results showed the two isolates had the same pattern. Genotyping 
tests now provide a powerful additional tool to help estimate the likelihood of recent 
transmission.  
This chapter will provide a general overview of genotyping results and how to interpret 
them in light of other data collected during the initial interview of the TB patient and the 
subsequent contact investigation. First, we will begin by defining certain key terms. Next, we 
will consider the simplest outcome, comparing the results of two isolates from two different 
patients. Then, we will discuss factors to be considered when three or more isolates are found 
to have matching genotypes. Finally, we will discuss how trends in the number of genotyping 
clusters have been used as a measure of the frequency of recent transmission.  
1. Definitions 
Matching Versus Nonmatching Genotypes 
The first objective in interpreting genotyping results is to decide if an isolate has a 
genotype pattern that matches any other isolate in the genotyping results database. Isolates that 
show a genotyping pattern that matches at least one other isolate in the database are referred to 
as belonging to the same genotyping cluster. An isolate with at least one other genotype match 
is also referred to as being clustered. If an isolate has a genotyping pattern that does not match 




In general, the determination of whether an isolate has a matching or a nonmatching 
genotype is straightforward, since the genotyping laboratory report will provide a PCR cluster 
designation for all isolates that have a matching spoligotype and MIRU type. If the genotyping 
laboratory report lists no PCR cluster designation, the isolate has a nonmatching or unique 
genotype. TB program staff can determine for themselves if there are any matching PCR 
genotypes by performing a simple Excel SORT command on the spoligotype and MIRU type 
results, since that command will group all matching isolates together. 
Two factors, however, complicate this picture. First, while all isolates will have 
genotyping results from the two PCR tests, only a subset of isolates will have IS6110–based 
RFLP results. When interpreting genotyping results from isolates that belong to a PCR cluster, 
it is important to remember that a subsequent RFLP analysis may reveal that some or all of the 
isolates have different RFLP patterns and do not, therefore, belong to the same genotyping 
cluster. In a more general sense, when one speaks of isolates belonging to the same genotyping 
cluster, it is important to clarify if the isolates belong to the same PCR cluster (and RFLP has 
not been performed) or if the isolates belong to the same PCR/RFLP cluster (Table 4.1). 
 
Table 4.1.  Genotyping cluster designations based on results of the three genotyping methods 
(spoligotyping, MIRU analysis, and IS6110-based RFLP). Only isolates that match by the two PCR 
methods should be analyzed by IS6110-based RFLP. 
IS6110-based RFLP results 
Performed PCR-based test results 
Not performed RFLP patterns 
match 
RFLP patterns do 
not match 
Both spoligotype and MIRU 
analysis show matching 
genotypes 
PCR cluster PCR/RFLP cluster Nonmatching (or unique) genotypes 
Either spoligotype or MIRU 
analysis show a nonmatching 
genotype 
*  Nonmatching (or 
   unique) genotypes 
*  Nonmatching (or 
     unique) genotypes 
*  Nonmatching (or 
   unique) genotypes 
*RFLP not indicated in this situation 
 
The second factor that complicates the definition of nonmatching genotypes involves the 
possibility that other isolates, either isolates in another TB program’s database or ones that 
may be genotyped in the future, may reveal matching genotypes. For example, consider a 
source patient, who lived and worked in Kansas City, Missouri and transmitted TB to one 
secondary patient at their place of work. If the secondary patient lived in Kansas City, Kansas, 
a search of the Kansas TB program’s genotyping database would not reveal a genotype match, 
nor would a search of the Missouri TB program’s genotyping database. If the two programs 
routinely compared their data, however, the match would be identified at that time. Similarly, 
if a source patient transmits TB to a secondary patient, and that secondary patient is not 
diagnosed at the same time, the initial review of the genotyping data will show that the source 
patient’s isolate has a nonmatching genotype. When the secondary case is diagnosed and the 
isolate genotyped, the source case’s status will change from nonmatching to matching. 
In summary, it is important to bear in mind that the classification of an isolate as 
matching or nonmatching is provisional and can change as new data become available. 
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Infectious Period 
The infectious period is a key part of determining if epidemiologic links exist between 
TB patients because it describes when a TB patient was most likely capable of transmitting TB 
to others. We will provide an operational definition of the term here, presented by whether the 
case was sputum smear positive or smear negative. 
• Sputum smear-positive cases:  the infectious period extends from 3 months before the 
first positive smear or symptom onset (whichever is earlier) until 2 weeks after the time 
of the start of appropriate TB treatment or until the patient is placed into isolation or the 
date of the first negative smear that is followed by consistently negative smears.  
• Sputum smear-negative cases: the infectious period is defined as beginning 1 month 
before symptom onset or start of appropriate TB treatment or when the patient was placed 
into isolation (whichever was earlier) until 2 weeks after the start of appropriate treatment 
or until isolation began. 
Epidemiologic Links 
Information on epidemiologic links between two patients with TB comes from data 
collected during the initial case interviews, the contact investigations, and a subsequent cluster 
investigation, if one is undertaken.  
Key data that help define epidemiologic links collected during the case interviews include 
the following: a) location where patients lived, worked, and spent time (in order to determine if 
the patients in a genotyping cluster were also clustered in space); b) the times that each patient 
was present at each of the locations (in order to determine if the patients were clustered in 
time); c) the infectious period; and d) social and behavioral traits that the patients might share 
that could increase the chance of TB transmission (e.g., drug use, homelessness, incarceration). 
Key data collected during contact or cluster investigations include the following: a) whether 
either patient named the other one as a contact; and b) whether the patients lived, worked, or 
spent time at the same place (this information may come from the initial case interview or from 
the contact investigation). During cluster investigations field staff members seek the same 
information, but because genotyping results are already available and describe the patients as 
belonging to the same genotyping cluster, cluster investigations are more focused and search 
for possible links that might have occurred farther in the past. 
What constitutes a known as compared with a possible epidemiologic link cannot be 
defined as precisely as a genotyping match. The text box, Summing Up: Defining 
Epidemiologic Links, lists general guidance about definitions that have proven helpful to some 
TB programs. As we learn more about how to interpret genotyping data, these definitions may 
need to be revised. And as with genotyping data, epidemiologic links are provisional at any 
point in time. A contact investigation might fail to identify an epidemiologic link that is 
discovered only during a subsequent cluster investigation. Similarly, a link may only become 
apparent when additional cases are added to a cluster and new information about how all the 
cases are related becomes apparent. Table 4.2 lists commonly identified relationships and 





Table 4.2.  Commonly identified relationships and settings that represent known epidemiologic links 
between TB patients.*  
Relationship or setting Frequency 
Relationship      
    Household member                                 47% 
    Common source†       27% 
    Friend or contact outside the home       23% 
    Co-worker         3% 
    Total    100% 
Setting  
    Emergency shelter      18% 
    Group quarters      11% 
    Prison or jail        7% 
    Nursing home         3% 
    Hospital           1% 
    School/day care        1% 
    Nontraditional setting§      59% 
    Total    100% 
*This analysis of unpublished NTGSN data includes 1,485 epidemiologic links between TB patients who 
had matching genotypes and for whom a contact or cluster investigation identified a likely location and 
relationship of transmission. 
† A common source was defined as two TB patients who were in the same place at the same time but did 
not fit into any of the other categories. 
§ Common nontraditional settings included bars/social clubs, churches/temples, drug/crack houses, and 




Summing Up:  Defining epidemiologic links 
 
Based on the information collected during case interviews, contact investigations, cluster 
investigations, and record reviews, TB patients in a genotyping cluster can be characterized 
by the strength of the epidemiologic links between them. 
 
Known epidemiologic link 
Two patients are said to have a known epidemiologic link if either of the following two 
conditions apply: 
• One of the patients named the other as a contact during one of the patient’s infectious 
period  
OR 
• The two patients were at the same place at the same time during one of the patient’s 
infectious period  
 
Possible epidemiologic link 
Two patients are said to have a possible epidemiologic link if any one of the following 
conditions apply: 
• The two patients spent time at the same place around the same time, but the timing of 
when they were there or the timing of the infectious period was not definite enough to 
meet the criteria for a known epidemiologic link 
OR 
• The two patients lived in the same neighborhood around the same time 
OR 
• The two patients worked in or were at the same geographic area around the same time and 
shared social or behavioral traits that increased the chances of transmission  
 
No identified epidemiologic link 
Two patients should be classified as having no identified epidemiologic link if they do not 
meet the criteria listed above.  
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2. Reading the Genotyping Laboratory Report 
Table 4.3 is a mock-up of some of the information that the genotyping laboratory report 
will contain when the laboratory transmits genotyping results to TB programs (actual reports 
contain additional information). For this example, we have assumed that these data are being 
reported to the “XY” State TB program. This mock-up report will be used to demonstrate the 
interpretation of genotyping results. 
The genotyping laboratory accession numbers are assigned by the genotyping laboratory 
to isolates as they are received from all programs. The first two digits in the accession number 
indicate the calendar year, the two letters indicate which of the two genotyping laboratories 
performed the typing, and the last four numbers are consecutive. The date received indicates 
the actual date the isolates were received at the genotyping laboratory. 
The spoligotype is the 15-digit octal designation for the spoligotype. The MIRU type is 
the 12-character result representing the copy number at the 12 MIRU loci. Note that letters and 
dashes may be used in these designations in addition to numbers. See Chapter 3, CDC 
Tuberculosis Genotyping Laboratory Procedures, for details about how spoligotype and 
MIRU designations are derived. 
The PCR cluster designation represents isolates from the same TB control program that 
have identical spoligotypes and MIRU types. If the isolate does not match any other isolate in 
the database, no cluster designation is listed. Isolate 03AA2621 matched a previously defined 
cluster (XY004) and is added to that cluster. Since other isolates in the cluster have been 
reported previously, they are not included on this report. Isolate 03AA2619 matched isolate 
03AA1422 (date received 6/16/03), which was typed previously but was not clustered when 
first reported. The two isolates were assigned to a new cluster, designated XY025. Although 
the spoligotype and MIRU type for isolate 03AA1422 were reported previously (date reported 
6/22/03), the result is updated to include the new cluster designation, reflected in the date 
clustered of 12/12/03. 
 


















XY 03AA2615 12/05/03 777777607760771 123326133227   12/12/03 
XY 03AA2616 12/05/03 776377777760771 233426163234   12/12/03 
XY 03AA2617 12/05/03 700000007760771 234325153323   12/12/03 
XY 03AA2618 12/05/03 677737607760771 224226143321   12/12/03 
XY 03AA2619 12/05/03 776377777760771 233326163224 XY025 12/12/03 12/12/03 
XY 03AA1422 06/16/03 776377777760771 233326163224 XY025 12/12/03 06/22/03 
XY 03AA2620 12/05/03 703707740003771 226425173533   12/12/03 
XY 03AA2621 12/05/03 777777777760771 223125153326 XY004 12/12/03 12/12/03 
XY 03AA2622 12/05/03 677777607760771 234325153323   12/12/03 
  *Actual report will contain additional information. See text for details. 
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Table 4.4 is a mock-up of some of the information contained in the report of IS6110-
based RFLP results. The isolates are identified by the genotyping laboratory accession number. 
No other patient data is needed, since it will be in the previous PCR result report. 
In this example, seven isolates of PCR cluster XY004 have been typed by IS6110 RFLP. 
The first two isolates have been assigned to PCR/IS6110 cluster XY004A. That means that 
they have the same spoligotype, MIRU type, and identical IS6110 RFLP patterns. Isolates 3-5 
are assigned to cluster XY004B, which means they have identical IS6110 RFLP patterns but 
are different from the first two isolates. The last two isolates do not match any of the others 
and thus are not assigned to a PCR/IS6110 cluster. All the isolates are assigned an RFLP 
pattern designation, which consists of the genotyping laboratory accession number and a dash 
followed by the number of bands in the RFLP pattern (14, 13, or 10 in these examples). For 
clusters, the designation for the isolate with the earliest accession number is used for all 
isolates. 
Isolate 03AA1857 differs from the isolates in cluster XY004B by the addition of a single 
band in the RFLP pattern. Since it is not identical, it is not included in the cluster, but the 
similarity is noted in the comments field. The band number is included in the pattern 
designation as additional information. Note that isolates having the same band number can 
have entirely different patterns. Some programs consider isolates differing by only a single 
RFLP band to be part of a genotyping cluster, which warrants inclusion in any subsequent 
cluster investigation. Others do not include such isolates in cluster investigations. All should 
recognize that genotype patterns can change over time due to natural mutations, and cases 
whose isolates differ by one RFLP band should not be excluded if epidemiologic links indicate 
the cases are related.  















03AA0046 XY004 03AA0046-14 XY004A 01/12/04  
03AA2621 XY004 03AA0046-14 XY004A 01/12/04  
03AA0364 XY004 03AA0364-13 XY004B 01/12/04  
03AA0533 XY004 03AA0364-13 XY004B 01/12/04  
03AA1215 XY004 03AA0364-13 XY004B 01/12/04  
03AA1648 XY004 03AA1648-10  01/12/04  
03AA1857 XY004 03AA1857-14  01/12/04 Differs from cluster XY004B by 1 band 
 
3. Comparing Genotyping and Epidemiologic Results from Two TB 
Patients 
In this section, we will analyze the most basic situation – the results of two TB patients. 
A conceptual framework for understanding the possible combinations of these results is 
provided in Table 4.5, which is separated into two categories: a) patients that were in fact 
involved in the same chain of recent transmission and b) patients that were not.  
Genotypes Match and Known Epidemiologic Link Identified  
If an investigation establishes that two persons with TB share a known epidemiologic 
link and their isolates have a matching PCR genotype, this provides good evidence that the two 
persons were involved in the same chain of recent transmission. This often means that one of 
the persons transmitted TB to the other, but it is also possible that both became infected by a 
third person. Other more complex transmission scenarios are also possible. Since the evidence 
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strongly supports recent transmission, no additional information needs to be collected from a 
cluster investigation, and an RFLP analysis is not indicated.  
Genotypes Match but No Epidemiologic Link or Only Possible Epidemiologic 
Link Identified  
In contrast to the previous example, whether two persons are involved in the same chain 
of recent transmission is less clear if they have isolates with matching genotypes but routine 
case and contact investigations failed to identify a known link between them. If the two 
persons were, in fact, involved in the same chain of recent transmission, failure to identify 
when and where transmission occurred could be the result of investigators not asking the right 
questions or the persons interviewed not knowing or being unwilling to give complete answers. 
For example, if an outbreak occurs among drug users, it might take a lengthy investigation 
conducted by highly skilled interviewers to discover even a few of the actual epidemiologic 
links. 
Another example of routine investigations being unable to discover hidden epidemiologic 
links are instances of casual contact. Casual contact was once thought to be a rare cause of TB 
transmission, but recent epidemiologic studies relying on genotyping results have shown that 
this concept needs to be updated. In a study conducted by the Maryland TB program, intensive 
interviews of 114 patients with matching genotypes and known source patients identified five 
patients who had only casual contact with the source patient (Cronin 2002). 
The following are several possible scenarios in which two persons who have isolates with 
matching genotypes might not be involved in the same chain of recent transmission.  
• The genotyping techniques used lack the power to discriminate between two isolates that 
are different. For example, if two isolates have matching PCR genotypes but different 
RFLP genotypes, the two isolates would be considered genetically different. If only the 
two PCR tests were conducted, however, and not the RFLP, the two isolates would be 
considered matched, even though they were genetically different.  
• The transmission of common endemic strains of M. tuberculosis occurs in relatively 
closed populations. In a study conducted by the Arkansas Department of Health and 
CDC, experienced field workers interviewed 78 patients whose isolates had genotypes 
that matched those of at least one other person; epidemiologic links could be identified 
for only 33 (42%). The authors concluded that in a rural setting the presence of matching 
genotypes often is not associated with recent transmission (Braden 1997). 
• An extensive outbreak of TB in the past leads to a large number of persons becoming 
latently infected with an identical strain of M. tuberculosis. Several years later these 
persons may reactivate their infections and develop active TB with matching genotypes. 
A contact investigation of these persons might well fail to establish an epidemiologic link 
between two patients, since the actual link connecting these patients occurred several 
years in the past. In a study by the New York City TB program of genotyping results for 
persons with MDR TB, of 153 persons who had matching genotypes, only 25 (19.8%) 
had epidemiologic links identified, and most persons had been exposed to patients 
diagnosed with TB before the study period, at a time when New York City was 
experiencing large outbreaks of MDR TB (Munsiff 2002). 
• Cultures become contaminated in the laboratory and cause a false-positive culture to be 
reported. For example, during the processing of two specimens in a clinical laboratory, if 
a break in technique occurs and one specimen that contains M. tuberculosis is allowed to 
contaminate another specimen that does not, subsequent genotyping tests will report that 
the two specimens have isolates of M. tuberculosis that have matching genotypes. 
 
Other types of laboratory error can occur and result in two isolates incorrectly being 
reported as having matching genotypes. For example, a submitting laboratory can mislabel 
specimens or ship the wrong specimen to the genotyping laboratory or the genotyping 
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laboratory can mislabel specimens, perform the genotyping incorrectly, or mix up reports so 
that one specimen is reported to have the results of another specimen.  
Genotypes Do Not Match but Known Epidemiologic Links Identified  
As has been stated, there are multiple reasons why matching genotypes might not be 
associated with recent transmission. In contrast, it is much less common for isolates with 
nonmatching genotypes to be the result of recent transmission, since genotypes that do not 
match indicate that the two isolates are genetically different (unless there was a laboratory 
error in reporting those nonmatching results). Other than laboratory error, two possibilities 
have been reported where recent transmission was documented even though the isolates had 
nonmatching genotypes. 
The first possibility occurs when the genotype of a particular strain of M. tuberculosis 
changes slightly over time. The DNA sequences on which genotypes are based have a 
tendency to mutate, change location, and be duplicated or deleted over time, forming the basis 
for the diversity of the genotypes. In another large outbreak of multidrug-resistant (MDR) TB 
in New York and surrounding areas, there was strong epidemiologic evidence that over 300 
patients were infected with the same strain of M. tuberculosis (Bifani 1996). Genotyping with 
IS6110-based RFLP showed that the patients were infected with isolates that had multiple 
closely related genotypes. The investigators concluded that the M. tuberculosis strain that 
caused this outbreak had evolved during the prolonged outbreak. In practice, slight changes in 
RFLP patterns appear to be more common than changes with the PCR-based tests. Therefore, 
when a TB program requests that the genotyping laboratory run an RFLP on isolates in a PCR 
cluster, the genotyping laboratory report will flag isolates that have different but very similar 
RFLP patterns. Note that RFLP patterns will not be compared among isolates that do not 
belong to the same PCR cluster. Similarly, spoligotype patterns and MIRU results can change 
slightly over time. In this case, closely related isolates can show spoligotype or MIRU 
designations that differ by only one character. The genotyping laboratory report will not flag 
instances of PCR designations that differ slightly. However, if two patients have known 
epidemiologic links but have different PCR designations, the spoligotype and MIRU 
designations should be examined to determine if they are closely related.  Isolates that match in 
all but one digit in the MIRU type or that have spoligotypes that differ in one region (as a 
result of loss of one or more spacers) should be considered closely related.  Programs should 
consult with the genotyping laboratory or CDC to determine if RFLP typing of such isolates is 
warranted.  
The second possibility occurs when a person is infected with more than one strain of M. 
tuberculosis. If a person with a dual infection transmits one strain to someone else, subsequent 
specimens from the two persons might grow the same strain of M. tuberculosis or might grow 
different strains, depending on which of the two strains grew from the specimen from the 
person with the dual infection. If different strains are grown from the two specimens, the 
isolates will have nonmatching genotypes. Although this situation has been reported, it is 
probably rare (Yeh 1999). 
As mentioned, isolates with nonmatching genotypes are only rarely associated with 
recent transmission, even if epidemiologic links are identified. A much more common 
explanation of nonmatching genotypes where epidemiologic links have been established is 
when the links do not reflect recent transmission, and the presumed source case was not the 
real source of transmission. A study from the National Tuberculosis Genotyping and 
Surveillance Network documented common scenarios in which a presumed epidemiologic link 
between a source case and a secondary case was not confirmed by genotyping (Bennett 2002). 
Two common scenarios occurred when the presumed secondary case-patient was born in a 
foreign country or when the presumed source case-patient was culture-positive but sputum 
smear-negative.  
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Nonmatching Genotypes with No or Only Possible Epidemiologic Links 
Identified 
When isolates from two persons have nonmatching genotypes and interviews with the 
two persons reveal no known epidemiologic links, the two are probably not involved in the 
same chain of recent transmission. TB in both persons could represent reactivation of a latent 
TB infection, or one person might have been recently infected from an unidentified source 
case. This could happen when the source case did not live in the same TB jurisdiction or if no 
isolate was available for genotyping from the source case. No additional information needs to 
be gathered to strengthen this conclusion. 
3. Comparing Genotyping Results from Three or More TB Patients 
In the previous discussion, we focused on possible transmission between just two TB 
patients. When a genotyping cluster grows to include three or more patients, additional 
information becomes available that can shed light on how the patients’ cases might be related. 
Table 4.5.  Conceptual framework for combining epidemiologic links with genotyping results for two tuberculosis 
cases. Percentages refer to the frequency that these categories were detected among 2,055 cases interviewed 
as part of the NTGSN study in the four sites that conducted cluster investigations of all TB patients with 
matching genotypes who did not have epidemiologic links identified during contact investigations (unpublished 
NTGSN data). 
1. Genotypes match (27%) 
a. Known epidemiologic links identified (8%) 
 Interpretation: Two cases probably involved in the same chain of recent transmission.  
b. No or only possible epidemiologic links identified (19%) 
1) Cases involved in same chain of recent transmission 
Interpretation: Failure to identify known epidemiologic links despite recent transmission could have 
been the result of: 
a) No contact investigation was conducted; OR 
b) Focus of contact investigation was too narrow (e.g., focus was limited to  
 household contacts when transmission occurred at a leisure site); OR 
c) Patients hid information about contacts; OR 
d) Inadequate interviews failed to identify epidemiologic links; OR 
c) Contact between cases was casual and unrecognized by them 
 2) Cases not involved in same chain of recent transmission 
Interpretation: Matching genotypes in the absence of recent transmission could have been the  
result of: 
a) Transmission of an endemic strain in a relatively closed population; OR 
b) False-positive culture(s); OR 
c) Laboratory error 
2. Genotypes do not match (73%) 
a. Known epidemiologic links identified (4%) 
1) Cases involved in same chain of recent transmission 
Interpretation: Nonmatching genotypes in two persons involved in the same chain of recent 
transmission could be the result of: 
a) Genotypes that changed slightly over time; OR  
b) Coinfection with >1 strain of M. tuberculosis; OR 
c) Laboratory error 
2) Cases not involved in same chain of recent transmission 
Interpretation: Nonmatching genotypes in two persons not involved in the same chain of recent 
transmission could be the result of: 
a) Misleading epidemiologic links identified 
b. No or only possible epidemiologic links identified (69%) 
 Interpretation: No evidence of recent transmission. 
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As additional TB patients are diagnosed and found to belong to a previously identified 
genotyping cluster, more information about possible epidemiologic links becomes available. 
The greater the number of leads an investigator has to follow-up, the greater the chance of 
identifying a shared link among patients in a cluster. 
Data on additional patients is also helpful in identifying endemic strains that are often 
found in the absence of evidence of recent transmission. When a TB program first initiates a 
genotyping program, it will be difficult to identify endemic strains until data from many 
patients are gathered and analyzed. After several years, a TB program will be able to identify 
M. tuberculosis strains that are commonly detected in their area but are rarely associated with 
patients who share known epidemiologic links. 
4. Clustering as a Surrogate Measure of Recent Transmission 
TB programs that implement universal genotyping, either program-wide or restricted to a 
county or adjacent group of counties, will have a powerful tool to analyze the epidemiology of 
TB in their jurisdiction. Programs that implement universal genotyping will be able to monitor 
changes in the percentage of genotyping clustered cases. To the extent that clustering reflects 
recent transmission, declines in this percentage over time will reflect progress toward 
eliminating transmission. 
There are several important caveats, however, in using genotype clustering as a surrogate 
measure of recent transmission. Some of these have already been described in the preceding 
discussion of matching genotypes. These include insufficient discriminatory power of 
genotyping methods, transmission of an endemic strain in a relatively closed population, false-
positive cultures, and laboratory error. Each of these limitations leads to an overestimate of the 
rate of recent transmission.  
One other factor also leads to an overestimate of recent transmission. Two cases with 
matching genotypes are counted as two clustered cases, but if one is the source case and the 
other is a secondary case, they represent only one episode of recent transmission. Similarly, 
three clustered cases, when one is the source case, represent only two episodes of recent 
transmission. Some epidemiologists have suggested that an adjustment should be made to 
account for this phenomenon (Small 1994). They argue that the most accurate way to apply 
genotyping results to make estimates of recent transmission is to exclude one case from the 
count of each cluster.  
Other factors may lead to underestimates of recent transmission. For example, an isolate 
from the source case might not have been genotyped, either because no culture was available 
or the isolate was not sent for genotyping. This happens frequently at the start of a new 
genotyping program, when there are few genotypes in the database. It is common for the 
percentage of isolates that cluster to increase over the first 2 or 3 years of a TB program’s new 
genotyping effort. Underestimation of recent transmission may also occur if the source patient 
lived in a different jurisdiction from the secondary patient; unless the two TB programs 
compared genotyping results, the identical genotypes would not be recognized as matching. 
Emilia Vynnycky and colleagues have developed sophisticated computer models to accurately 
predict how these factors influence the accuracy of clustering data (Vynnycky 2003)  
Because of the shortcomings associated with using genotype clustering as a surrogate 
measure of recent transmission, another alternative should be considered. As discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 6, Applying Genotyping Results to Tuberculosis Control Practices, by 
combining genotyping results with epidemiologic information, TB programs can obtain a more 
specific estimate of the amount of recent TB transmission that is occurring in their 
jurisdictions. We define epidemiologically confirmed recent transmission as a patient who 
belongs to a genotyping cluster and shares known epidemiologic links with another patient in 
that cluster. Monitoring the percentage and the rate of recent transmission provides useful 
information about the effectiveness of programs to interrupt transmission. 
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Initiating a TB genotyping program requires planning and coordination. In this chapter, 
we discuss the key components of the planning and coordination process that TB programs 
should consider in developing a genotyping plan. For each component, we provide suggestions 
about how a TB program may proceed. In Chapter 6, Applying Genotyping Results to 
Tuberculosis Control Practices, we will discuss how the specific procedures described here 
can be utilized to interpret and take action on new genotyping results as they are reported by 
the genotyping laboratories.  
In the initial phase of establishing a TB genotyping program, it is important to develop an 
effective system for communication among the various persons who will be involved. It is also 
important to provide clear explanations of the goals of the program. The CDC Tuberculosis 
Genotyping Program is not a research program, but rather a public health service to enhance 
TB control. Over time, genotyping M. tuberculosis isolates will help identify TB cases that are 
the result of recent transmission.  
1. Developing a Written Plan 
TB Programs should develop a written plan to describe activities, responsibilities, and 
procedures for their TB genotyping programs. The New York City and the Maryland TB 
programs graciously agreed to share copies of their genotyping plans with other TB 
controllers. These plans are posted on the WebBoard at http://web-tb.forum.cdc.gov. 
To help TB programs develop a plan, Table 5.1 lists important initial steps that should be 
considered. Which steps are required and which are recommended depend on the decision the 
TB program makes about the initial scope of their genotyping program. How to make the 
Genotyping Guide 
36 
decision about the initial scope of the genotyping program and the steps in Table 5.1 are 






2. Initial Decisions 
Clarifying Activities and Assigning Responsibilities 
A TB genotyping program plan will involve many persons from many organizations 
working together. It will be helpful if activities and responsibilities are clarified at the 
beginning. Table 5.2 lists some key activities and provides suggestions about which groups 
may be responsible for each activity. 
 
Table 5.1.  Steps in establishing a state genotyping program plan. 
 Universal: statewide 
Universal: 
subregion Selective 
1. Identify labs that might submit isolates Required Required Recommended 
2. Notify submitting labs of genotyping program and 
provide them with a copy of the TB Genotyping 
Isolate Submission form 
Required Required Recommended 
3. Negotiate payment for shipping isolates to  
genotyping laboratories Required Required Recommended 
4. Establish submission procedures: batch 
shipments, frequency of shipments, avoiding 
duplicate submissions  
Required Required Required 
5. Establish an isolate tracking system Required Required Required 
6. Establish criteria for selecting isolates to be 
submitted does not apply does not apply Recommended 
7. Establish procedures to identify isolates selected 
for submission does not apply does not apply Required 
8. Assign responsibility to the person who will 
receive Genotyping Laboratory Report Required Required Required 
9. Establish a genotyping data management system Required Required Required 
10. Establish procedures for evaluating genotyping 
results and other existing data to make decisions 
about need for additional investigations, such as 
cluster or outbreak investigations  (see Figure 
5.1) 
Required Required Required 
11. Establish criteria for requesting RFLP Required Required Required 
12. Consider advocating for a new state health 
regulation to submit one isolate/patient to state 
public health laboratory 
Recommended Recommended Recommended 
13. Consider networking with adjacent TB programs 
to encourage interjurisdictional exchange of 
genotyping information 
Recommended Recommended Recommended 
14. Obtain CDC approval for plan Required Required Required 
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Table 5.2.  Suggested activities and responsibilities for TB genotyping programs. 
Activities Responsibility 
Establishing a TB Genotyping Program Plan Usually, this will be done by the state/large city TB 
program. In unusual circumstances, and with prior 
approval of the state TB program, a city that does not 
have a cooperative agreement with CDC may submit 
a plan for approval. 
Deciding on initial scope of isolate submission:  
a) only selected isolates; b) all isolates in state;  
c) all isolates from predefined geographic area  
State/large city TB program 
Clarifying roles and assigning responsibilities State/large city TB program 
Submitting isolates to the genotyping laboratories 
for genotyping 
Public health laboratories and/or clinical laboratories 
will submit isolates. The state/large city TB program 
will provide instructions on how this is to be done. 
Performing genotyping and reporting results to the 
TB program 
Genotyping laboratory 
Managing genotyping database and tracking 
isolates that are submitted for genotyping 
State/large city TB program 
Receiving and recording genotyping laboratory 
reports 
State/large city TB program 
Responding to genotyping results State/large city and local TB programs 
Providing genotyping technical consultations Genotyping laboratory and CDC 
Providing epidemiologic consultations State/large city TB program and CDC 
 
Deciding on Initial Scope of Genotyping Program: Three Options 
Universal genotyping (i.e., submitting all isolates from a TB program to the genotyping 
laboratories) holds great promise for improving TB control. We believe that, within the next 
few years, programs will want to have all their M. tuberculosis complex isolates genotyped, 
just as they now have all their isolates analyzed for drug susceptibility patterns. However, for 
programs to implement a genotyping program, they will have to invest additional resources to 
pay for shipping the isolates to the genotyping laboratories. Programs may also have to hire 
additional staff or assign new duties to existing staff so they are able to administer the program 
and respond to newly identified genotyping clusters. Thus, initially, some programs will not be 
able to implement universal genotyping.  
There are three options for selecting the isolates that will be submitted to the genotyping 
laboratories for genotyping. 
Option 1: Universal submission of isolates program-wide 
This option involves submitting one isolate from every patient with a culture-
positive specimen in a TB program’s jurisdiction. 
Advantages of universal genotyping. This option provides the greatest benefit. 
Universal program-wide genotyping provides the best understanding of the epidemiology 
of tuberculosis transmission within the entire TB program’s jurisdiction and uncovers the 
greatest number of unexpected outbreaks, clusters, and false-positive cultures.  
Disadvantages of universal genotyping. This is the most expensive option, and it 
requires a substantial commitment of resources. 
Option 2: Universal submission of isolates from a selected subregion 
In this option, a specific geographic area is selected (e.g., a particular county TB 
program or several adjacent county programs), and all isolates that come from patients in 
the area are submitted.  
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Advantages of universal genotyping in a subregion. This option provides all the 
benefits of universal program-wide genotyping as they apply to the specific region. It 
will be more manageable than a program-wide effort. After a county universal 
genotyping program is set up and running well, the program may be expanded to other 
counties or to an entire state.  
Disadvantages of universal genotyping in a subregion. The full benefits of 
universal program-wide genotyping will not be realized. If a TB program decides to 
adopt Option 3, the following questions should be considered in selecting county TB 
programs to participate:  
• Is there buy-in from the county TB programs? 
• Can isolate submissions be coordinated easily? (It will be easier to work with a 
county where most isolates can be submitted by one laboratory than with a county 
where isolates would be submitted by multiple laboratories.) 
• If more than one county will participate, are the counties contiguous? 
• Do the counties have a large number of TB cases? (Although it may be easier to start 
in a county with a small number of cases, the benefit will be greater in a county with 
many cases.) 
• Does TB occur often in high-risk populations in the counties of interest? 
Option 3:  Selective submission of isolates 
A policy of selective submission is a decision by the TB program to submit only 
those M. tuberculosis isolates that meet certain criteria. This option allows programs that 
cannot implement universal genotyping to take advantage of the services of the 
genotyping laboratory. For example, if the TB program suspects that several TB cases are 
involved in the same chain of recent transmission, isolates from these patients can be 
submitted to the genotyping laboratory. Similarly, if a TB program or a laboratory 
suspects that a diagnosis of TB is the result of a false-positive culture, the isolate from 
the diagnosed case-patient and the isolate that might have been identified as the possible 
source of the false-positive culture can be submitted for genotyping. 
Advantages of selective genotyping. It saves shipping costs because only high-
priority isolates are submitted. The selective submission option will also minimize the 
number of times a TB program will need to conduct a cluster investigation, because the 
TB program will submit for genotyping only those isolates from high-priority suspected 
clusters. 
Disadvantages of selective genotyping. First, selective genotyping does not allow 
a TB program to realize the full benefit of genotyping. Because only selected isolates are 
genotyped, the TB program will be less likely to learn about unsuspected recent 
transmission. With selective genotyping, you can confirm only what you already suspect. 
For similar reasons, the discovery of unsuspected false-positive cultures, which is one of 
the most important benefits of universal genotyping, is not possible with selective 
genotyping. 
The second disadvantage of selective genotyping is that it requires several steps to 
locate and request submission of isolates; these steps are not necessary with universal 
genotyping. For example, under a policy of selective submission, if an outbreak is 
suspected and a TB program wants to submit isolates from the patients who are 
considered part of the outbreak, the TB program must determine which patients have 
culture-positive isolates and what laboratories have those isolates. The TB program must 
send a request to the laboratories; the laboratories must locate and possibly subculture the 
isolates before they can be sent to the genotyping laboratories. With universal 
genotyping, all isolates are submitted automatically for genotyping; no person at the TB 
program would need to identify isolates for genotyping or to make an individual request 
to the laboratories, and the laboratories might have prepared an isolate for shipment as a 
routine part of their procedures for processing cultures. 




Identifying Laboratories that Will Submit Isolates to the Genotyping 
Laboratories 
The TB program that opts for universal genotyping, either program-wide or within a 
particular county, needs to identify the laboratories in their jurisdiction that will submit M. 
tuberculosis isolates to their genotyping laboratory. The TB program that opts for selective 
genotyping may wait to contact submitting laboratories until the program identifies specific 
isolates to be submitted. 
If all M. tuberculosis isolates are sent to the state public health laboratory for routine 
isolation and identification or for drug susceptibility testing, it will be easier to have that 
laboratory be responsible for submitting isolates to the genotyping laboratory. If the state 
public health laboratory does not receive all isolates, the TB program should explore the 
feasibility of establishing a new state health regulation that calls for all M. tuberculosis isolates 
to be submitted to the state laboratory. The regulatory language used by the New York City TB 
program to have all isolates submitted to their public health laboratory is available for review 
on the WebBoard at http://web-tb.forum.cdc.gov. 
If a new regulation is not feasible or is delayed, and the state public health laboratory 
cannot be the only entity that will submit isolates to the genotyping laboratory, a process will 
have to be implemented to identify the laboratories that isolate and identify M. tuberculosis 
from patients in the state or county. This will include state and county public health 
laboratories, private laboratories, large commercial laboratories (which may include out-of-
state laboratories), and laboratories at medical centers and hospitals. 
Laboratories perform various types of services. For the purpose of submitting isolates, 
only laboratories that identify isolates as M. tuberculosis complex should be considered. 
Laboratories that isolate mycobacteria but do not process them further do not have to be 
considered, although such laboratories may be conduits for reporting results to clinicians or to 
the TB program.  
Many laboratories isolate and identify M. tuberculosis and then send the isolates to a state 
or reference laboratory for susceptibility testing. In these cases, either the originating or 
reference laboratory could be designated as the entity to submit isolates for genotyping. Asking 
the originating laboratory to submit isolates will provide the most rapid turnaround, but this 
will require the originating laboratory to ship the isolate twice: once to the reference laboratory 
and once to the genotyping laboratory. Many laboratories may find this unworkable. 
The Division of Laboratory Systems at CDC developed the National Laboratory 
Database (NLD) of all Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA)-approved 
laboratories in the United States. CDC provides access to this database to all 50 state public 
 
Summing Up:  Deciding on Initial Scope of Genotyping Program 
 
One of the first decisions a TB program must make is the initial scope of their genotyping 
program. There are three options: 
 
Universal genotyping program-wide provides the most benefit, but it requires a substantial 
investment in program resources. 
 
Universal genotyping for a subregion (a single county or adjacent county TB programs) 
provides some of the benefits of statewide universal genotyping but is easier to initiate and 
costs less. 
 





health laboratory directors. One of the variables is mycobacteriology, which allows a state 
public health laboratory director to download a list of every laboratory that performs some 
level of mycobacteriology testing. The system also allows the state laboratory director to 
download an accurate mailing list of these laboratories. TB programs that want to use the NLD 
should request approval from their state laboratory director, asking that the director grant NLD 
access to a specific person by sending an email to Dr. Rex Astles at JAstles@cdc.gov. 
Establishing a Communications Plan 
Effective communication among the state and local TB programs, state laboratory, 
submitting laboratories, and the genotyping laboratory is critical to the success of genotyping. 
Planning for an effective communications system should be one of the initial steps in 
developing a genotyping program. The system (e.g., a shared web-based database, e-mail, 
telephone, or fax) will depend on local capabilities. Approaches to ensure that patient 
confidentiality is maintained should be addressed. 
3a. Establishing Procedures for Submitting Isolates 
A challenging aspect of initiating a TB genotyping program is establishing procedures for 
submitting isolates to the genotyping laboratory. Each TB program will face unique issues; 
however, general aspects of the problems programs will have to address are discussed in the 
following sections.  
Establishing a Relationship with Submitting Laboratories 
The TB program will need to work with the state public health laboratory and other 
submitting laboratories to develop a plan for shipping isolates. TB programs will want to 
notify submitting laboratories about the genotyping program and ask about their willingness to 
submit isolates, either directly to the genotyping laboratories or to the state laboratory. A wide 
range of responses can be anticipated. TB programs should be prepared for requests for 
detailed instructions, shipping materials, reimbursement for shipping costs, and other 
conditions for participation, including the requirement for a specific request from the TB 
program for each isolate. 
Negotiating Payment for Shipping Charges 
Because neither the genotyping laboratories nor CDC will pay the shipping charges for 
isolates sent from the clinical laboratories or the state public health laboratory to the 
genotyping laboratory, payment procedures will need to be worked out by the TB Program. 
See Procedures to Reduce Shipping Costs. 
Communicating Submission Procedures to Laboratories 
The usefulness of genotyping results to the TB program is related directly to the 
timeliness of the information, and the genotyping laboratory procedures are designed to 
provide rapid turnaround. The most likely factor affecting how quickly the TB program will 
receive genotyping results will be the period of time that elapses between the identification of 
a culture as M. tuberculosis complex and the shipment of that isolate to the genotyping 
laboratory. Therefore, it is important for the TB program to establish procedures that minimize 
this delay. These procedures and information on acceptable and unacceptable material to be 
submitted should be shared with the submitting laboratories. 
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Procedures to Reduce Shipping Costs 
Because complying with current biosafety standards can be expensive, procedures are 
needed for batching isolates in a single shipment to reduce costs. It costs approximately $50 to 
mail one container by an expedited carrier to a genotyping laboratory. One container can 
accommodate more than 40 2-ml freeze vials, but only eight L-J slants. If the state public 
health laboratory is the only laboratory that will submit isolates and isolates are shipped in 
freeze vials, the shipping costs will be very reasonable. On the other hand, if numerous 
laboratories submit and ship isolates as L-J slants, the costs will mount quickly. In establishing 
submission procedures, the TB program should balance the importance of timely submission 
of isolates with the cost savings associated with batching isolates. 
Frequency of Shipments 
The frequency of shipments will vary depending on the number of isolates obtained 
per week balanced with the needs of the TB program for rapid turnaround. For example, 
state laboratories that process 10 or more isolates per week should ship weekly. 
Laboratories with two or three isolates per week may want to ship every 2 weeks. TB 
programs in low-incidence areas may need to ship each isolate as soon as it is identified. 
Avoiding Duplicate Submissions 
TB programs should establish procedures to minimize the submission of duplicate 
specimens from the same patient. The following section titled, Establishing Procedures 
for Submitting Additional Isolates from the Same Patient, explains the rare exceptions to 
this rule. In the interest of maintaining rapid turnaround times, the genotyping 
laboratories will permit occasional inadvertent submission of duplicate isolates. 
Isolate Tracking System 
TB programs will have to establish a tracking database system to verify the 
submission of patient isolates and the receipt and genotyping of the isolates by the 
genotyping laboratory. A tracking system will also allow the TB program to send a 
reminder to the submitting laboratory if an isolate is not submitted in a timely fashion. 
Additional Submission Procedures Required for Selective Genotyping 
If only selected isolates are to be submitted, the TB program will have to take the 
following additional steps: 
• Establish a procedure to identify all patients with newly diagnosed culture-positive TB.  
• When a new diagnosis of culture-positive TB is made, review the information obtained 
during the contact investigation to determine whether the patient’s isolate is a high 
priority for genotyping.  
• If the patient’s isolate is to be genotyped, contact the laboratory that has the isolate and 
request that it be sent to the genotyping laboratory. 
• The submitting laboratory may need to subculture the specimen before sending it to the 
genotyping laboratory. 
 
Programs that decide to adopt selective genotyping should consider what types of isolates 
would have the highest priority for submittal. The following four criteria, from the most 
important to the least important, can guide the selection of isolates. 
• Cultures that represent suspected false-positive cultures 
• Patients suspected to be part of an outbreak 
• High-risk groups (e.g., homeless or other persons who live in congregate settings, HIV-
infected or other immunocompromised persons, or children) 
• Patients with recurrent TB 
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3b. Establishing Procedures for Receiving and Acting on Genotyping 
Results 
The TB program will be responsible for receiving the genotyping report results from the 
genotyping laboratories, incorporating the new information into existing databases for analyses 
and actions, and distributing relevant information to local TB programs. This section describes 
options for establishing procedures for these components. 
Receiving Genotyping Reports from the Genotyping Laboratory 
The TB program must designate a person to receive the genotyping reports and identify 
that person on the CDC Tuberculosis Genotyping Program Application Form. If possible, the 
TB program should establish a data management system that can receive the genotyping 
laboratory reports by e-mail as an Excel attachment and electronically combine the new 
genotyping results with existing patient data. These procedures must be done in a manner that 
protects patient confidentiality. 
The TB program will also need to designate the person who will have primary 
responsibility for analyzing and making initial decisions on the basis of the genotyping data. In 
highly centralized programs, all case information may be available to the TB controller, and 
most decisions can be made in that office. In other systems, it will be necessary to distribute 
the results to local programs or case managers for primary analysis and decision making. In 
both situations, it will be necessary to distribute appropriate information to local program staff 
members who are responsible for patient care. 
3c. Establishing Procedures for Requesting RFLP Analysis 
The two PCR-based genotyping methods (spoligotyping and MIRU analysis) provide 
sufficient discriminatory power for most TB control purposes. IS6110-based RFLP analysis 
can provide additional discriminatory power, but usually it is not needed. Because RFLP 
analysis is labor-intensive, its use should be limited to situations where additional information 
that can be provided only by RFLP will guide further action. 
RFLP analysis is indicated only for isolates that have already been found to have 
matching PCR genotypes. One purpose of genotyping is to determine whether isolates are 
genetically distinct and therefore unlikely to be involved in the same chain of recent 
transmission. If any genotyping test shows that two isolates have different genotypes, this 
provides strong evidence that the two isolates are genetically distinct. Additional testing of 
genetically distinct isolates will not change the conclusion that they are genetically distinct. 
Therefore, if two isolates have different spoligotypes or different MIRU types, the results of 
the RFLP analysis will rarely be helpful. In the following discussion of when to request an 
RFLP analysis, it is assumed that isolates have already been tested by spoligotyping and MIRU 
analysis and that both tests resulted in matches. 
TB programs should request RFLP analysis usually for isolates from patients who are 
involved in ongoing investigations of outbreaks, because it is important to know with as much 
accuracy as possible whether the isolates represent the same strain of M. tuberculosis. During 
outbreak investigations and during contact investigations of multiple cases with isolates that 
match by the two PCR tests, RFLP results help to establish which patients belong to the 
outbreak and which patients do not. Either result helps to focus the outbreak investigation on 
those patients involved in the same chain of transmission. 
Some false-positive culture investigations should include RFLP analysis, but others do 
not require it. The determination of when to request RFLP analysis during a false-positive 
culture investigation rests on whether there was a preexisting suspicion of a problem. In 
circumstances where the treating physician or the clinical laboratory suspects a false-positive 
culture, a match by spoligotype and MIRU analysis is sufficient to confirm that suspicion. On 
the other hand, if the PCR genotyping results showing a possible false-positive culture were 
unexpected by the laboratory and the clinicians, RFLP analysis should be requested to confirm 
the PCR results. 
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When patients who are clustered by the two PCR tests are thought to be involved in the 
same chain of recent transmission and previous contact investigations established known 
epidemiologic links between them, chances are very good that RFLP results will confirm the 
genetic identity of the isolates. Therefore, in this case, RFLP analysis is not indicated. In 
contrast, for similar patients for whom only possible epidemiologic links have been found (i.e., 
PCR test results match and patients could be involved in recent transmission), RFLP analysis 
should be considered. Here, the presence of possible epidemiologic links raises the question of 
whether the patients represent the same chain of recent transmission. If RFLP results show that 
the isolates are different, the TB program will decide that no cluster investigation is needed 
because the RFLP results indicated that no cluster existed. If the RFLP pattern shows a match, 
the TB program will have added motivation to conduct a cluster investigation. 
A final situation that could warrant a request for RFLP analysis occurs when certain 
strains of M. tuberculosis match by spoligotyping and MIRU analysis but can be differentiated 
only by RFLP. This situation may become increasingly important as we gain more information 
about the distribution of isolates that match by spoligotyping and MIRU analysis. The 
genotyping laboratories will be a good source of information about the need for conducting 
RFLP analysis in this situation. 
 
 
3d. Establishing Procedures for Submitting Additional Isolates from the 
Same Patient 
Under normal circumstances, the genotyping laboratories will genotype only one isolate 
from each patient with TB. Like drug-susceptibility test results, there is usually no benefit in 
testing additional isolates. There are exceptions to this rule, however, and some of them are 
discussed in the following sections. 
Evaluate Likelihood of Exogenous Reinfection versus Relapse 
Patients who recently completed therapy but subsequently become ill may have been 
infected with a different strain of M. tuberculosis (i.e., exogenous reinfection), or they may 
have had a relapse of their initial infection that was caused by the same M. tuberculosis strain. 
Genotyping the subsequent isolates will help distinguish between these two possibilities.  
 
Summing Up:  When to Request IS6110-based RFLP 
 
Request RFLP only for isolates that have matching spoligotyping and MIRU genotypes and 
when the RFLP results may alter your decision about further action steps. If these two 
prerequisites are met, use the following criteria to help you make a decision. 
 
Usually request RFLP when conducting 
• an outbreak investigation 
• certain false-positive culture investigations  
 
Consider requesting RFLP when investigating 
• clustered patients with possible epidemiologic links 
 
Consult with the genotyping laboratory when investigating strains that are known to cluster 





Assess Discrepant Drug Susceptibility Test Results 
A second patient isolate should be submitted for genotyping when drug susceptibility 
results differ substantially among isolates from the same patient. Although discrepant results 
can indicate that the patient’s isolate has developed secondary drug resistance, the results may 
be caused by a false-positive culture. Genotyping the subsequent isolate will help distinguish 
between these two possibilities. 
Evaluate Questionable Genotyping Results 
A second isolate from the same patient may be considered for submission when the 
genotyping results from the first isolate are not compatible with epidemiologic information. 
For example, if two TB patients were identified as having spent a prolonged period of time 
together in the same place but their isolate genotype patterns do not match, a second isolate 
should be submitted for genotyping to evaluate the possibility that an error occurred. Such 
errors can occur during the following steps: submission of the isolate, processing of the isolate 
at the genotyping laboratories, or transmission of the results to the TB program. If the 
genotyping results for the second isolate are identical to those of the first isolate, the most 
likely explanation is that the initial epidemiologic information was incorrect or not relevant to 
the actual chain of transmission. 
4. Comparing Genotyping Results Between Jurisdictions 
Experience has shown that most TB transmission occurs within a single TB program’s 
jurisdiction. On the basis of this experience, the genotyping laboratories will consider the 
genotyping results from each TB program separately when they look for genotyping matches. 
In other words, the genotyping laboratories will identify genotyping matches only among 
isolates that came from patients residing within the jurisdiction of a specific TB program.  
Although this policy will identify almost all important genotyping matches, there will be 
instances of interjurisdictional TB transmission that are not detected. The NTCA/CDC 
Advisory Group on Tuberculosis Genotyping is working to develop possible ways to identify 
and alert TB controllers about possible interjurisdictional TB transmission. Whatever system is 
adopted, it will be important to consider epidemiologic data in addition to genotyping data in 
order to make decisions about the need for further investigations. 
The following interim plans will help TB programs identify interjurisdictional TB 
transmission while we work on a comprehensive approach. CDC will review all genotyping 
laboratory reports as they are submitted to detect any instances of interjurisdictional 
genotyping matches. Depending on how unusual the genotyping pattern is (common 
genotyping patterns are less likely to represent recent transmission than never-before-seen 
patterns), on the geographic distribution of the genotyping cluster (interjurisdictional matches 
among adjacent TB programs are more likely to represent recent transmission than matches 
from TB programs that are widely separated), and on information about epidemiologic links 
that have been discovered by TB programs, CDC will notify TB programs of the 
interjurisdictional genotyping matches that are most likely to represent recent transmission. As 
experience with the new PCR genotyping methods grows and we learn more about the utility 
of identifying interjurisdictional genotyping matches, we will modify this approach.  
As another interim measure, TB programs can contact adjacent TB programs and 
exchange genotyping results. For example, if one TB program is interested in a particular 
genotyping cluster in their jurisdiction, they can ask the adjacent program whether they have 
detected isolates with the same spoligotype and MIRU type. Adjacent TB programs can also 
agree to form a network to share all their genotyping results. For example, genotyping results 
could be posted on a web site, or results could be shared routinely by e-mail. Anyone who 
belongs to the network could sort the results and easily identify cross-jurisdictional genotyping 
matches. 
Initially, CDC announced that interested TB programs could request that the genotyping 
laboratory search its database for any matches that came from adjacent TB programs where 
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interjurisdictional transmission had been documented. As a result of that announcement, CDC 
received an unexpectedly large number of requests, including from states that were not 
adjacent to each other. Because the benefit of matching results from large geographic areas is 
not yet known, CDC will not be able to accommodate all the requests it has received. As more 
is learned about the utility of searching for possible interjurisdictional genotyping matches, this 
policy will be reanalyzed.   
5. False-Positive Cultures 
An important use of genotyping is to detect or confirm suspected false-positive cultures 
that are due to cross contamination, mislabeled specimens, and other errors. Procedures for 
dealing with false-positive cultures differ somewhat, depending on whether the error was 
suspected before the genotyping results were known or the error was identified as a result of 




“Genotyping of TB isolates is particularly useful in the evaluation of 
patients who have only a single culture-positive specimen, a population for 
whom up to 40% of the isolates are false-positive. Timely evaluation of 
these isolates prevents unwarranted isolation, treatment and contact 
investigations. Genotyping is also useful over the intermediate time period 
of months to several years in clarifying the role of recent transmission in 
high-risk populations and methods of intervention. Genotyping in Denver 
identified a large outbreak that was introduced by a patient who 
defaulted from TB treatment in Louisiana. This data lead to an ongoing TB 
screening program that has detected such cases earlier and lead us to 
aggressively pursue the location of defaulters who leave our area.”  
 
   Randall Reves, MD 
   Director  




Suspected False-Positive Cultures 
A laboratory may suspect that an M. tuberculosis-positive culture represents an error 
when two or more specimens processed on the same day become positive or when only one 
culture out of many from the same patient becomes positive. A clinician may suspect a false-
positive culture when TB is diagnosed for a patient on the basis of a single culture but the 
patient has an incompatible clinical picture. 
When a false-positive culture is suspected, the laboratory or clinician may want to verify 
this suspicion before they report the patient as having a new case. The TB Genotyping Isolate 
Submission Form includes a field to identify an isolate as a possible false-positive culture (the 
column title is “suspected_false_positive”). When the suspicion of a false-positive culture is 
flagged on the form, the genotyping laboratory will send the genotyping results to the 
submitting laboratory and to the TB program. The TB program should discuss this procedure 
with laboratories in its jurisdiction and agree on a process for submission of the isolates, either 
directly or through the state laboratory, and perhaps use an expedited protocol. All isolates 
submitted to the genotyping laboratory will receive rapid turnaround, so there is no need to 
request expedited typing. When the spoligotype and MIRU type for a suspected false-positive 
culture match the genotype of the putative source isolate, this provides strong evidence that the 




Unsuspected False-Positive Cultures 
False-positive cultures can also be detected by analysis of genotyping results. A TB 
program’s genotyping plan should include a procedure for evaluating all matching isolates for 
the possibility that one or more represent an unsuspected false-positive culture. Unsuspected 
false-positive culture results that are identified on the basis of matching PCR genotyping 
results should be confirmed with RFLP analysis. The genotyping laboratories will not have 
sufficient patient or laboratory information to help decide whether particular matching isolates 
represent false-positive cultures, except in the instance of contamination with common 
laboratory control strains.  
6. Database Management and Quality Control 
Genotyping programs rely on the collection and analysis of large quantities of data. TB 
programs that are implementing genotyping programs for the first time have to address 
database management issues. Although a detailed discussion of the options for database 
management is beyond the scope of this document, this section summarizes key points. 
Central databases for isolate tracking, laboratory results, and epidemiologic data are 
essential. Because cluster investigations are an epidemiologic activity, the TB program should 
maintain the principal databases for isolates and contact investigations. Although clustering 
occurs most frequently in relatively small geographic areas (i.e., a single county or adjacent 
counties), genotyping clusters can be widespread and are not bound by state lines. Including 
the number for the Report of a Verified Case of Tuberculosis (RVCT) or the state case number 
in all database entries will allow a comparison of data from different jurisdictions. 
In order for field workers to have access to needed information, data must be abstracted 
from different databases and merged. The information in these databases can enable TB 
programs to identify easily patients with matching genotypes and epidemiologic links.  
The TB program should establish a database management system that includes and links 
at least three elements. 
• TB surveillance data (e.g., data collected for the RVCT). TB surveillance data contain 
demographic information, patient’s risk factors, and sputum and smear results. 
• Laboratory results data. At a minimum, data will include a) the patient’s name, b) 
RVCT or state case number, c) patient’s status (e.g., isolate represents a verified case of 
TB, a false-positive culture, or a duplicate isolate), d) patient’s county of residence, e) 
accession numbers of submitting and genotyping laboratories, f) names of originating and 
submitting laboratories, g) specimen source, h) dates of specimen collection and culture 
report, i) drug-susceptibility pattern, j) genotyping laboratory report results, and k) cluster 
designations. Because a suspicion of a false-positive culture is often based on the 
presence of only a single positive culture, this information should be captured in the 
database as well. 
• Epidemiologic data. A database is essential for maintaining information about 
relationships between and among every patient with matching genotypes so that results 
can be analyzed effectively. At a minimum, the database should include a) the patient’s 
name; b) RVCT or state case number; c) case report date; d) whether patient has 
epidemiologic links with other clustered patients; e) source patient’s name; f) setting of 
transmission; and g) whether the link was established by a contact investigation, a cluster 
investigation, or another method. 
Quality Control 
Collecting data on certain process measures is essential to ensure and improve the quality 
of the genotyping program. For example, turnaround times should be monitored so that 
progress in reducing turnaround can be documented. TB programs should decide what process 
measures they will collect and evaluate. Programs should consider collecting data to provide 
answers to the following questions: 
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• Of the isolates that met submission criteria, how many were submitted or lost or are 
pending? 
• How much time elapsed between the date of culture report and the date of isolate 
submission? 
• How much time elapsed between the date of isolate submission and the date the TB 
program received the genotyping laboratory results?  
 
Epidemiologic investigation process measures are equally important and should include 
the following questions: 
• How much time elapsed between the identification of a cluster that required a cluster 
investigation and a record review or patient interview? 
• How many patient interviews were needed and how many were conducted? 
• Why were needed interviews not conducted (e.g., patient lost, died, moved, or refused)?   
• How many attempts were made to contact a patient (i.e., times and type of attempts)?   
• How many epidemiologic links were identified and when (i.e., before or after genotyping 
results)? 
 
Standard Forms for Data Collection 
Standardized forms are required to ensure that data are collected in the same way for 
every patient. A template for collecting cluster investigation information in a standardized 
manner is posted on the WebBoard at http://web-tb.forum.cdc.gov. 
 The form can be employed for cluster investigations in its present format, or it can be 
modified to suit the specific needs of a TB program.  
7. Special Issues  
Continuity Between Past Genotyping Activity and New Genotyping Programs 
Many programs have IS6110-based RFLP results on a large number of isolates. It will 
not be possible for the new genotyping laboratories to perform spoligotyping and MIRU 
analysis on a large number of previously collected isolates. But if the TB program has on-
going outbreaks that have been documented by genotyping and you believe there may be 
additional cases in the future, a single isolate from each outbreak may be submitted for 
genotyping. A reasonable definition of an outbreak is a cluster of at least four patients who 
have matching genotypes that includes at least one patient who received a TB diagnosis within 
the last 3 years. A notation that these isolates came from previous outbreak cases should be 
made in the “Comments” field of the TB Genotyping Isolate Submission Form.  
Genotyping Guide 
48 
Evaluation of the Usefulness of Genotyping 
The TB program should collect data that allow an evaluation of the impact of the 
genotyping program on their TB control practice. Consider the following as helpful items to 
track: 
• Unsuspected outbreaks identified through genotyping. 
• False-positive cultures identified through genotyping. 
• Epidemiologic links between two TB cases that were identified during contact 
investigations and later confirmed or refuted by subsequent cluster investigations. 
• New epidemiologic links that were identified during cluster investigations but not 
discovered during previous contact investigations. 
 
These data can be used to evaluate the impact of the genotyping activity. It should be 
noted that the value of genotyping for detecting unsuspected transmission increases over time. 
The minimum time needed for establishing a background of genotypes for an area is 2–3 years.  
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6 




1. Evaluating Matching Genotypes 
2. Evaluating Nonmatching Genotypes 
3. Suspected False-Positive Culture Investigations 
4. Expanded Contact Investigations 
5. Outbreak Investigations 
6. Cluster Investigations  
7. Monitoring Trends 
 
This chapter provides guidelines for interpreting and responding to new genotyping 
results as they are reported by the genotyping laboratories. Specifically, we will describe how 
new information about genotyping matches can be combined with information about 
epidemiologic links between patients with TB in order to identify chains of recent TB 
transmission and take appropriate action to stop transmission (or, in the case of a false-positive 
culture, to stop treatment for patients who were falsely diagnosed with TB). Possible action 
steps include expanding a contact investigation, conducting an outbreak investigation, 
performing a cluster investigation in order to search for epidemiologic links between patients 
with matching genotypes, and determining whether a specific report of a TB case resulted from 
a false-positive culture report. Figure 6.1 provides a graphical representation of the steps 
involved in the decision analysis of when to take possible action steps. Finally, we will discuss 
how genotyping data provide a powerful tool to monitor trends in TB transmission. 
Chapter 5, Developing a TB Genotyping Program, described the critical components of a 
TB genotyping program and the key procedures that need to be established to collect and 
analyze genotyping and epidemiologic data. The current chapter will focus on using that data 
in a decision analysis in order to identify specific action steps to take to improve TB control 
practices.  
1. Evaluating Matching Genotypes 
The first step in responding to new genotyping results is to identify any new genotyping 
matches contained in the laboratory report. The genotyping laboratory will flag all isolates 
with matching spoligotypes and MIRU types by assigning them a PCR cluster designation. 
Except in rare instances, two persons who are involved in the same chain of recent 
transmission will have isolates with matching genotypes; conversely, two persons with 
nonmatching isolates are rarely involved in the same chain of transmission (See Chapter 4, 
Combining Genotyping and Epidemiologic Data to Improve Our Understanding of 




Figure 6.1.  Flow diagram describing the evaluation of genotyping results. This diagram describes the action steps 
(shown in grey boxes) that might result from an analysis of new genotyping data. 
 
 
Could Genotyping Matches be Due to False-Positive Cultures? 
When new genotyping matches are reported, the first question to pose is whether one or 
more of the matching isolates might represent false-positive cultures? Since the discovery of a 
false-positive culture may require that a patient’s treatment be stopped, the TB program must 
maintain a high index of suspicion for the possibility of false-positive cultures, and there 
should be no delay between receiving new genotyping results and determining if any matches 
might need further investigation. 
False-positive cultures occur when M. tuberculosis bacteria from one specimen, 
instrument, or culture inadvertently contaminate another specimen or culture, when clerical 
errors occur and specimens are mislabeled or misreported, or when data entry errors occur. 
Clinical equipment (e.g., bronchoscopes, sputum collection booths, and ultrasonic nebulizers), 
if inadequately cleaned, can become contaminated and be the source of false-positive cultures 
(as well as the source of nosocomial transmission). Cross contamination can occur in the 
laboratory during batch processing, pipetting, transfer of bacilli from a broth-culture system, 
work in a faulty exhaust hood, and species-identification procedures. 
One of the most important advantages of routinely fingerprinting all M. tuberculosis 
isolates is the ability to establish an early warning system to identify suspected false-positive 
cultures. Although this discussion is based on the assumption that the suspected false-positive 
culture was identified through a genotyping laboratory report, this suspicion can also be raised 
by health-care providers who receive a questionable culture result from a clinical laboratory, 
from the laboratory itself when more than one M. tuberculosis culture that was processed 
during the same time period become positive, or by health department staff members who 
investigate TB cases. 
Known epi links 
identified during contact 
investigation and record review?
Cluster >2 persons 
or high-risk population?
(see Table 6.1)
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The following text box lists the factors to look for in evaluating whether a cluster might 
involve one or more false-positive culture results. If any one of the factors listed in the text box 
are identified, a false-positive culture investigation should be conducted immediately (see 
Suspected False-Positive Culture Investigations later in this chapter for details). Note that to 
evaluate the factors listed, the TB program needs access to data about how and when the 
specimens were processed and whether particular patients have only one or more than one 
positive culture result. If these data are not readily available at the time the genotyping matches 
are reported, the TB program should update their data collection and management procedures. 
If this initial evaluation determines that the genotyping matches do not represent a false-
positive culture, the next step in the decision analysis depicted in Figure 6.1 is to decide if 
patients in the cluster share known epidemiologic links. 
 
 
Summing Up:  False-Positive Cultures 
 
Suspect that a genotyping match might represent a false-positive culture if any of the 
following are true: 
• The health-care provider or the clinical laboratory suspects a false-positive culture 
• A patient had only one positive culture among multiple specimens obtained 
• A patient did not have symptoms of TB 
• A patient’s chest radiograph did not show findings consistent with TB 
• A patient had another confirmed diagnosis to explain symptoms 
• The specimens were processed in the same laboratory on the same day 
• The isolates were collected in the same hospital or clinic within 3 days 
• The spoligotype and MIRU patterns match those of laboratory control strains (H37rv or 




Action Steps for Genotyping Clusters with Known Epidemiologic Links 
Identified 
Known epidemiologic links (see Chapter 4, Combining Genotyping and Epidemiologic 
Data to Improve Our Understanding of Tuberculosis Transmission, for definitions of 
epidemiologic links) between at least some of the members of the same genotyping cluster 
suggest that they are part of the same chain of recent TB transmission. The evidence in favor 
of recent transmission is strong enough at this point in the decision analysis that it is usually 
not necessary to collect additional data by requesting RFLP analyses of the isolates or by 
conducting a cluster investigation for the purpose of deciding on appropriate action (see 
Chapter 5, Developing a Tuberculosis Genotyping Program, for exceptions to this rule).  
Two possible action steps are described in this situation in Figure 6.1: a) expanding the 
contact investigations or b) initiating (or expanding) an outbreak investigation. The decision 
about which step to take is based on what is known about the cluster from previous 
investigations and whether the cluster of cases has grown to be an outbreak. 
Deciding when an epidemiologically conformed genotyping cluster has become an 
outbreak is always a challenge. The following text lists characteristics of outbreaks that may 
help in this decision-making process; an outbreak is likely occurring if any one of the 
following criteria is met. 
Three criteria for defining an outbreak 
1. An increase in the expected number of TB cases.  
Although this is a standard epidemiologic definition, it is at times a challenge to 
apply, since the expected number of TB cases in a specific setting is often difficult to 
know. This criterion is more useful if it is applied to specific subgroups of persons who 
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share demographic characteristics or specific exposures rather than to the population as a 
whole.  
For example, two unrelated children with TB who go to the same school and are in 
the same classroom would arguably meet the “unexpected increase” criterion for an 
outbreak, since under normal classroom circumstances the expected number of children 
with TB would be zero. Two homeless men with TB in the same city, on the other hand, 
would probably not meet this criterion, since TB in homeless men is more common than 
in school-age children.  
Universal genotyping will help considerably in identifying outbreaks, since it will 
help to provide an answer not only to the question “is there an increase in the number of 
cases in a subgroup?” but also to the question “is there an increase in cases that belong to 
a specific genotyping cluster that involves recent transmission?” Another helpful aspect 
of having genotyping results available is that they will help define the scope of an 
outbreak, since genotyping results can identify persons with genotyping links to outbreak 
cases where no epidemiologic links were known.  
 
2. Transmission continues despite adequate control efforts by the TB program.  
For example, two TB patients who work at the same job might not be considered an 
outbreak. If each was well investigated, including thorough contact investigations with 
appropriate screening and treatment for LTBI, there might be little else to do. If, 
however, an additional person with TB appeared a month later with an isolate that was a 
genotype match to the isolates from the other two persons, this might meet the criterion 
of ongoing transmission despite an apparently adequate TB-program response. 
 
3. The contact investigation has grown to a size that requires additional outside 
help.  
This often happens when a TB program is devoting most of its resources to 
conducting a large contact investigation, but the demand for resources continues to 
increase to the point that the program cannot meet its routine obligations for basic TB 
control practices. At this point, declaring the situation to be an outbreak can lead to 
obtaining additional resources to conduct an outbreak investigation from the state 
program or from CDC. If the decision is made to conduct an expanded contact 
investigation or an outbreak investigation, see the respective sections for guidance about 
how to proceed. 
Genotyping Clusters with Possible Epidemiologic Links Identified 
The next decision point shown in Figure 6.1 focuses on genotyping clusters where known 
epidemiologic links have not been established. The next question to consider is whether 
previously collected data from contact investigations and record reviews show that persons in a 
genotyping cluster share possible epidemiologic links. If possible epidemiologic links are 
identified (e.g., the TB patients live in the same neighborhood or were homeless) (see 
Chapter 4, Combining Genotyping and Epidemiologic Data to Improve Our Understanding of 
Tuberculosis Transmission, for a definition of possible epidemiologic links), the patients might 
be involved in the same chain of recent transmission and further investigation might be 
helpful, especially if the genotyping cluster has more than two patients or if the patients are 
considered high-risk. If the RFLP results show that the presumed cluster is, in fact, made up of 
genetically distinct isolates (i.e., the isolates have non-matching RFLP patterns), there is no 
need to conduct a cluster investigation. 
If, on the other hand, the RFLP results confirm that the isolates belong to the same 
PCR/RFLP cluster (i.e., if the RFLP patterns match), the TB program should consider 
conducting a cluster investigation 
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Whether to Launch a Cluster Investigation 
Cluster investigations should be launched only when needed, since they can be labor 
intensive. If RFLP results confirm that the isolates belong to a single PCR/RFLP cluster, it is 
helpful to compare the characteristics of the cluster with the prioritization scheme described in 
Table 6.1. This prioritized list should not be interpreted as providing absolute instructions 
about when to conduct a cluster investigation and when not to; rather, it provides helpful 
guidance about when a cluster investigation is needed and when it might be wise to wait to see 
if additional TB patients are identified as belonging to the cluster. The information that this 
prioritization scheme is based on comes from the NTGSN study, and parts of it may have to be 
updated when our experience with the PCR genotyping methods grows. 
Most commonly, clusters involve only two persons. One way to save valuable TB 
program resources is to investigate only clusters that involve at least three persons. Some 
programs will want to investigate clusters of only two persons; if resources are available to do 
so, this aggressive approach will identify episodes of recent transmission sooner. If resources 
are scarce, however, conducting investigations only of clusters with at least three persons is a 
reasonable policy. In fact, if resources are really scarce, conducting a cluster investigation only 
when the cluster grows to four persons may have to be adopted as an interim policy until more 
resources are identified.  
The decision as to what cluster size should be investigated is influenced by whether the 
cluster contains high-risk persons. “High-risk” in this setting refers to a) characteristics of the 
persons in the cluster that might make them particularly infectious (e.g., having cavities on 
chest radiographs), b) characteristics of the M. tuberculosis strain that make it particularly 
dangerous (e.g., a multidrug-resistant strain), or c) characteristics of persons in the cluster that, 
if shared by their exposed contacts, would increase the risk of progression from LTBI to active 
TB (e.g., HIV infection or other immunocompromising conditions) or would increase 
transmission among a group (e.g., jail inmates, nursing home residents, the homeless). A TB 
program that would otherwise decide to conduct investigations only of clusters containing at 
least three persons might decide to conduct an investigation of a two-person cluster if one or 
the other persons with TB was considered “high-risk.” 
Additional information that comes from future genotyping laboratory reports may tip the 
balance in favor of conducting an investigation. If one laboratory report identifies a two-person 
cluster, the TB program might decide not to begin a cluster investigation if neither of the two 
persons is “high-risk.” If the next laboratory report identifies a third person with a matching 
genotype, the TB program will probably want to initiate a cluster investigation of all involved 
persons. In general, the decision whether to launch a cluster investigation is a dynamic process, 
and a decision at an early stage not to do one should not inhibit a TB program from changing 
its mind should new information become available. If the decision is made to conduct a cluster 





Table 6.1.  Prioritizing genotyping cluster investigations. 
Priority 
(from high to low) Type of cluster Rationale for priority 
Suspected false-positive culture Need to determine which patients do not 
have TB and stop treatment  
Cluster of three or more high-risk* 
patients with possible epidemiologic 
links 
Need to confirm or exclude recent 
transmission in large clusters of high-risk* 
patients 
Cluster of two high-risk* TB patients 
with possible epidemiologic links 
Smaller clusters less likely to yield 
epidemiologic links, but presence of high-risk 
patients deserves attention 
Cluster of three or more low-risk TB 
patients with possible epidemiologic 
links 
Investigation of low-risk patients less urgent 
than high-risk* patients, but larger clusters 
may deserve attention 
Cluster of two low-risk TB patients 
with possible epidemiologic links  
Investigation of smaller clusters of low-risk 
patients often does not yield helpful 
information 
Investigations can, however, provide data for 
monitoring program performance 
Cluster of high-risk* TB patients 
who have not been found to have 
even possible epidemiologic links 
Low yield for establishing new epidemiologic 
links 
Investigations can, however, provide data for 
monitoring program performance  
Reserved for programs with sufficient 
resources 
 
Cluster of low-risk TB patients who 
have not been found to have even 
possible epidemiologic links 
 
Very low yield for establishing new 
epidemiologic links  
Investigations can, however, provide data for 
monitoring program performance 
Reserved for programs with sufficient 
resources 
* “High risk” is defined as patients living in congregate settings (e.g.,  correctional institutions and nursing 
homes), persons infected with HIV or having other immunocompromising conditions, children, patients with 
cavities on chest radiographs or with MDR TB, and the homeless. 
Genotyping Clusters with No Epidemiologic Links 
Not all genotyping clusters represent recent transmission, and conducting a cluster 
investigation when the chance of gaining new information is slim is often not a wise 
investment of resources. If information from adequately conducted contact investigations and 
case interviews does not reveal even possible epidemiologic links between patients in a 
genotyping cluster, it is probably sufficient for TB programs to simply ensure that standard TB 
control measures are completed, such as ensuring that all cases are completely treated and all 
infected contacts are identified and treated appropriately. Of course, if future genotyping 
matches are identified and new patients are added to a genotyping cluster, new epidemiologic 
links within the cluster may become apparent, and at that point the TB program may need to 
initiate a cluster or an outbreak investigation. 
2.  Evaluating Nonmatching Genotypes 
The previous discussion focused on genotyping matches. The following discussion will 
describe possible action steps for isolates that have nonmatching genotypes. If the genotyping 
laboratory reports that an isolate has a unique genotype that does not match any other isolates 
from the TB program’s jurisdiction, no further genotyping tests are required to conclude that 
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the isolate is genetically distinct. Specifically, there is no reason to request RFLP if PCR tests 
have shown that an isolate has a unique genotype pattern. 
Nonmatching Genotypes with Known Epidemiologic Links 
Results from the NTGSN study show that patients with nonmatching genotypes often had 
known epidemiologic links identified during previous contact investigations. In these cases, 
three possibilities exist: a) the genotypes changed slightly over time, b) the previously 
identified epidemiologic links are misleading and do not reflect recent transmission, or c) the 
genotyping results are erroneous or misleading. Although there is little information available 
about the relative frequencies of these three possibilities, the standardized nature of the 
genotyping tests and the ambiguities involved in conducting contact investigations suggest that 
misleading epidemiologic links are much more common than incorrect genotyping results. 
The possibility that genotypes have changed slightly over time is easy to evaluate. 
Isolates that match in all but one digit in the MIRU type or that have spoligotypes that differ in 
one region (as a result of loss of one or more spacers) should be considered closely related.  
Programs should consult with the genotyping laboratory or CDC to determine if RFLP typing 
of such isolates is warranted. RFLP patterns can also change slightly over time. In these cases, 
the RFLP patterns will differ by only a single band. 
There are two common characteristics of patients identified with known epidemiologic 
links and nonmatching genotypes; if either of these characteristics is present, the probability 
that the epidemiologic links are incorrect or misleading is even higher. As discussed in Chapter 
4, Combining Genotyping and Epidemiologic Data to Improve Our Understanding of 
Tuberculosis Transmission, epidemiologic links that have later been shown to be inconsistent 
with genotyping results have occurred when the presumed secondary case-patient was born in 
a foreign country or when the presumed source case-patient was culture-positive but sputum 
smear-negative. If either of these characteristics is present, these epidemiologic links 
presumably do not indicate recent transmission. 
Incorrect or misleading genotyping results are not common. They can, however, occur 
under unusual circumstances. Persons can be infected with more than one strain of M. 
tuberculosis at the same time. If an infection with two strains of M. tuberculosis is suspected, 
the TB program should consult with the genotyping laboratory about testing additional isolates 
from that person. Finally, a genotyping laboratory error can occur. A specimen might be 
mislabeled, an isolate might be contaminated, or there might be an error in reporting. If any of 
these are suspected, the genotyping laboratory should be consulted.  
Nonmatching Genotypes and No Known Epidemiologic Links Identified 
If a particular isolate shows a unique genotype pattern that has not been reported from a 
jurisdiction in the past, and if the contact investigation of the person with the non-matching 
genotype did not reveal any epidemiologic links with other cases or only possible 
epidemiologic links, there is insufficient evidence of recent transmission to support additional 
investigations. Although future genotyping reports might identify new patients with matching 
genotypes (and if they do, additional investigations might be required at that point), at this 
point in the decision analysis there is little additional work that is necessary, except to ensure 
that routine TB control measures have been taken.  
Concluding Remarks on Decision Analysis 
At this point in the decision analysis, genotyping data have been combined with 
information about possible epidemiologic links in order to determine what specific action steps 
are needed. The following sections describe the goals, steps, and the expected outcome of 
those action steps.  
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3. Suspected False-Positive Culture Investigations 
Goal 
The goal of a suspected false-positive culture investigation is to confirm (or refute) the 
suspicion that one or more of the patients in a genotyping cluster has been falsely diagnosed 
with TB on the basis of a false-positive culture result. 
Steps 
The first step of an investigation of suspected false-positive cultures is to gather 
information to verify or refute that suspicion. Clues that are helpful in deciding if a false-
positive culture occurred fall into two categories. The first type of clue comes from an analysis 
of the path that the suspect specimens took from collection through the final laboratory 
processing step to identify possible common collection or processing points and common 
times that could have resulted in cross-contamination. The second type of clue comes from 
reviewing medical records to identify patients in the cluster who, despite a diagnosis of TB, do 
not fit the typical clinical picture of the disease. The TB program should alert providers of any 
patient with a suspected false-positive culture result in order to determine the patient’s clinical 
status and if the patient is receiving anti-tuberculosis treatment. 
Possible sources and locations of cross-contamination of clinical specimens include 
bronchoscopes, sputum collection areas, and laboratory processing steps. The laboratory that 
reported the suspect culture should be contacted and asked to provide information on all M. 
tuberculosis isolates from any specimens collected or processed on the same day or within a 
few days of the suspect isolate. If a contaminated bronchoscope or other instrument or a 
sputum collection booth is implicated in cross contamination, the respective health-care facility 
should be contacted and asked to provide information on other patients who were examined 
with the same instrument or had sputum collected in the same location. Information on all 
implicated specimens should be recorded and compared to identify potential overlap that could 
have resulted in cross-contamination. Realize that M. tuberculosis can remain viable in certain 
environments for days. 
Clues to patients who may have been misdiagnosed with TB include patients diagnosed 
with pulmonary TB but who have normal chest radiographs, patients who were diagnosed with 
a different condition before the suspect M. tuberculosis culture results were reported, patients 
who have not been started on treatment for TB or who were started only after the culture 
results were reported, and patients who have had multiple specimens evaluated for M. 
tuberculosis but only one positive specimen. Finally, if genotyping results of isolates from 
suspected false-positive cultures were not the basis of initiating the investigation, those results 
should be obtained as soon as possible. All M. tuberculosis isolates that were collected or 
processed at the location or during the time that the cross contamination might have occurred 
should be genotyped. 
Deciding whether to request RFLP analysis on isolates identified as part of a false-
positive culture investigation depends on the strength of the available evidence. Experience has 
shown that if the laboratory or the health-care provider suspected a false-positive culture 
before the PCR genotyping results indicated a match, the PCR results are sufficient to confirm 
the presence of a false-positive culture. If, on the other hand, the PCR cluster results were the 
first indication of a problem, RFLP analysis of the clustered isolates should be requested.  
Outcome 
A suspected false-positive culture result should be considered “confirmed” as being false 
if a) all three genotyping methods show a match with the presumed source of the false-positive 
culture (or, if a previous suspicion of a false-positive culture existed and the PCR genotyping 
methods show a match), b) the investigation confirmed that the suspect isolates were processed 
at the same time or collected in the same location or with the same instrument, c) there is no 
other likely explanation for the findings, and d) the presumed misdiagnosed patient does not 
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have a clinical picture consistent with TB. If critical specimens are unavailable for genotyping 
but all the other criteria are met, a suspected false-positive culture result should be considered 
“likely.”  
A suspected false-positive culture result should be considered “unlikely” to be false (i.e., 
it is likely that the culture results of M. tuberculosis are correct) if the genotyping results do 
not show a match between the isolate from the suspected false-positive culture and other 
isolates processed at the same time or collected at the same place. 
If the investigation leads to the conclusion that a false-positive culture result is confirmed 
or likely, the next steps are a) to identify which patients actually have TB and which patient or 
patients were misdiagnosed on the basis of false-positive culture results, b) to alert the 
involved health-care providers so that they can correctly diagnose and treat the misdiagnosed 
patient, and c) to alert the involved clinical laboratory or health-care facility so that the cause 
of the false-positive culture can be determined and corrected. 
Identifying Sources of Error 
Although it is possible to determine if a suspected false-positive culture result is 
confirmed, likely, or unlikely without first identifying the precise mechanism that led to the 
problem, it is obviously important to document this mechanism so that it can be corrected. 
Identifying the precise nature of the problem also aids in our understanding of how these types 
of errors can occur and the importance of adhering to procedures that will prevent them.  
The laboratory or health-care facility that was involved should be contacted and provided 
the results of the investigation and the preliminary interpretation. In a collaborative fashion, 
the investigation should be finalized, and steps should be taken to describe as thoroughly as 
possible the precise mechanism that led to the false-positive culture result. Necessary 
procedural changes should be described and instituted, including updated quality-control and 
quality-assurance procedures. Technical assistance may be required and should be offered by 
state and national reference laboratories. 
Communicating Results of Investigation  
Once a final determination is made about the likelihood of a culture result being false and 
the likely source of error, the TB program should communicate the results of the investigation 
to the appropriate persons. The health-care providers of the patient or patients who were 
misdiagnosed need to receive this information immediately. The facility or laboratory that was 
determined to be the source of the error should also receive the final report of the investigation. 
Finally, there should be a formal reporting process for collecting and analyzing the results of 
false-positive cultures so that TB programs can monitor their frequency and track problems 
that can be remedied. 
Possible Additional Steps 
• Send a fact sheet to each implicated laboratory during the investigation describing the 
risk of M. tuberculosis laboratory cross-contamination and steps to prevent it. 
• Assess and educate clinical laboratories when a false-positive culture event is identified. 
• Provide local and statewide education to laboratory staff regarding prevention steps and 
early detection of persons who have false-positive specimens. 
• Provide local and statewide education to local program staff regarding early detection of 
laboratory cross-contamination. 
• Report the number of false-positive events, number of persons treated, number of months 
treatment was given, and basic characteristics of laboratories where these events 
occurred. 
• Summarize these data on a national level for use in recommendations for 
mycobacteriology laboratory practice. 
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• Review findings periodically to determine whether specimen contamination has been 
reduced or whether contamination is suspected more frequently. 
4. Expanded Contact Investigation 
Goal 
The goal of an expanded contact investigation is to ensure that all contacts of an 
infectious TB patient have been identified, evaluated, and treated appropriately. Although the 
goals of a regular contact investigation and an expanded contact investigation are the same, an 
expanded contact investigation involves applying greater resources to identifying and 
evaluating contacts, since the possibility of recent transmission to contacts has been confirmed. 
Steps 
Although the details of conducting an expanded contact investigation are beyond the 
scope of this guide, the key steps are described in this section. CDC and NTCA are developing 
revised guidelines for conducting contact investigations, which should be available in 2005. 
An additional source of information is CDC’s Self-Study Module 6, Contact Investigation for 
Tuberculosis, which can be ordered from CDC.  
The first step in an expanded contact investigation is to ensure the completeness of the 
initial contact investigation of close contacts. This is most easily done by creating a database of 
contacts to facilitate their management. For each contact, information should be entered into 
the database to designate completion of each of the key components of a contact investigation: 
contact interview, symptom screening, tuberculin skin testing, evaluation for active TB for 
contacts with positive TSTs or symptoms, and treatment for LTBI, for those who require 
treatment. The second step in an expanded contact investigation is to include second- and 
third-tier contacts. These are often leisure contacts and work contacts who were not included in 
the initial contact investigation. The same information should be gathered for second- and 
third-tier contacts as was described above for close contacts identified during the routine 
contact investigation. 
Outcome 
The expected outcome of an expanded contact investigation is the complete processing of 
all contacts of an infectious TB patient, the identification of any active cases among those 
contacts, and the treatment to completion, when indicated, of contacts with LTBI.   
5. Outbreak Investigations 
Goals 
The goals of an outbreak investigation are to identify and treat all case-patients with 
active TB to stop transmission and to identify all case-patients with LTBI that would benefit 
from treatment, and assure that treatment is completed so the outbreak does not continue in the 
future. Another goal of an outbreak investigation is to a) understand the transmission dynamics 
that link TB patients and persons with LTBI involved in the outbreak so that high-risk 
populations can be identified and potentially targeted for future screening efforts and b) 
expand our knowledge of how outbreaks occur. 
Steps 
An outbreak investigation has similar components to those of a contact investigation with 
several important differences. One important difference is the need to expand the scope of the 
identification and evaluation of potential contacts. In many contact investigations, the focus is 
on contacts that were named by the TB patient. In contrast, in an outbreak investigation, the 
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focus shifts to persons who spent time at any location or social gathering identified by the TB 
patients.  
Since this expanded universe of potential contacts often identifies many more persons 
than can be evaluated with resources that are usually available, an important step of an 
outbreak investigation is to develop an algorithm that identifies the contacts who are at highest 
risk of TB transmission and progression to TB disease once infected. This involves defining 
the infectious period for each TB case-patient, defining the exposed cohort of persons at each 
location or gathering, determining the duration of exposure to the case-patient, and using this 
information to prioritize the various exposed cohorts for screening. For details about 
conducting an outbreak investigation, see Appendix B, Core Steps in an Outbreak 
Investigation. 
In the previous discussion of the decision analysis depicted in Figure 6.1, RFLP analysis 
was described only for patients who had possible epidemiologic links. Most patients in an 
outbreak are connected by known epidemiologic links, and an RFLP analysis of their isolates 
usually will show a matching pattern. Nevertheless, it is usually wise to perform an RFLP 
analysis on isolates from all patients involved in an outbreak who have matching spoligotypes 
and MIRU types in order to obtain additional confirmation of these suspected transmission 
links. 
Outcome 
The expected outcome of an outbreak investigation is to stop transmission of TB. This 
involves the rapid identification and treatment of all infectious cases and the identification and 
treatment, if indicated, of cases of LTBI. Evaluation of the success of an outbreak investigation 
involves monitoring outbreak-related cases to verify the cessation of treatment, or when 
additional cases are diagnosed, to ensure they are rapidly detected and treated so they do not 
transmit TB to others. 
6. Cluster Investigations 
Goal 
The goal of a cluster investigation is to uncover previously unrecognized epidemiologic 
links between persons in a genotyping cluster and to take appropriate action steps. 
Steps  
Cluster investigations involve taking multiple steps and collecting information from 
multiple sources. Detailed cluster investigation protocols and data collection forms have been 
developed by several state TB programs and are available for review and downloading at the 
CDC WebBoard at http://web-tb.forum.cdc.gov under TB Genotyping. Table 6.2 lists some of 
the important steps to consider when conducting a cluster investigation. For each step, it will 
be important to assign responsibility to either the state or the local TB program. 
After the decision to launch a cluster investigation is communicated to the local programs 
that managed the patients in the cluster, the next key step is to analyze existing information 
about the patients in the cluster in order to determine what is already known about how the 
patients might be related. In most cases, the local program should take the lead on reviewing 
existing information about all persons in a cluster. This information can come from a review of 
existing information already collected about the persons (e.g., the initial case interviews and 
contact investigations) and from talking with the case managers, epidemiologists, or outreach 
workers who know the patients.  
The state and local programs should work together to analyze the results of the existing 
information to determine if interviews with the patients themselves are needed. If this initial 
data abstraction and interview process identifies a) epidemiologic links between all cases in the 
cluster, b) the direction of transmission from source to secondary cases, and c) where the 
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transmission probably occurred, persons in the cluster may not need to be interviewed. If the 
cluster is a high priority to investigate and it is decided that a patient interview is required, it is 
usually best for the local program to take the lead on conducting patient interviews. On the 
other hand, if local staffing is insufficient, the state program staff may need to help out. 
 




Receive genotyping laboratory report. Communicate with local program(s)   
Review existing records on clustered cases and interview case managers, 
epidemiologists, or outreach workers who know the clustered persons to identify 
potential epidemiologic links 
  
Analyze data from record reviews and staff interviews to determine need to 
interview patients   
Interview clustered patients to ascertain epidemiologic links   
If local staffing is insufficient, interview selected high-priority patients   
Review findings in collaboration and determine need for further action   
 
If a decision is made to interview the patients in a cluster, the existing information 
gathered and analyzed during the previous steps will be helpful in guiding the subsequent 
interviews. Interview forms are also helpful, and a template of a cluster investigation form (TB 
Cluster Investigation Form.doc) is available from the CDC WebBoard.  
Although any information that is gained may hold the key to understanding how 
transmission between persons in the cluster might have occurred, the most valuable 
information to collect often involves the persons’ social history, their behaviors, where they 
spend their leisure time, church and school attendance, what health-care facilities they have 
visited, foreign travel, work history, incarceration, whether they are residents of a nursing 
home or a single-resident occupancy hotel, or if they have slept at homeless shelters. The time 
period of focus for the cluster investigation is usually longer than for a contact investigation. In 
order to understand the possible transmission dynamics of cases that led to the present cluster, 
questions about behaviors and leisure-time activities should seek information for the preceding 
5 years, even though recent transmission is defined as occurring within the previous 2 years. 
After the first patient is interviewed in the cluster investigation, the person conducting the 
interviews should update the interviewer notes to take into account any new information 
gained during the first interview. The locations, activities, or behaviors identified during the 
first interview should become prompts for subsequent interviews. Questions about specific 
locations, however, should not be asked during subsequent interviews in order to ensure 
confidentiality. 
Outcome 
If known epidemiologic links have not been identified between the persons with 
matching genotypes, no further action is required at this point. Of course, saying that no 
epidemiologic links were identified is not the same as concluding that no epidemiologic links 
exist, and the absence of links does not mean that recent transmission did not occur. If TB 
patients who have a matching genotype that adds them to this cluster are identified in the 
future, the chances increase that an undiscovered epidemiologic link exists. In this case, a 
careful analysis of possible links that might explain all the patients in a cluster should be 
undertaken.  
If the cluster investigation has been able to establish known epidemiologic links between 
persons in the cluster, the TB program should decide if these linked persons represent an 
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outbreak and if an outbreak investigation is indicated. Alternatively, if an outbreak is not 
thought to be occurring, the TB program probably will still want to expand the original contact 
investigation to include contacts that might share the same link that exists between the 
clustered patients. 
7. Monitoring Trends 
Data that is collected as part of a genotyping program can provide new indicators of 
program performance. TB programs that institute selective genotyping will not be able to take 
full advantage of these indicators, but programs that implement universal genotyping will be 
able to use them to better evaluate program performance. 
Interventions aimed at reducing TB transmission are fundamentally different from 
interventions aimed at reducing the risk of reactivation of LTBI. Universal genotyping 
provides the ability to differentiate cases that probably resulted from recent transmission from 
cases that were probably the result of reactivation of LTBI, and this ability provides TB 
program staff with a method to separately monitor changes in these two parameters. The 
NTCA/CDC Advisory Group on Genotyping is working to develop standardized definitions 
and data collection forms to assist TB controllers to monitor these important indicators.  
PCR Clustering Percentage 
The most basic indicator is the percentage of cases that are clustered compared to the 
percentage that are not clustered. As discussed in Chapter 4, Combining Genotyping and 
Epidemiologic Data to Improve Our Understanding of Tuberculosis Transmission, isolates that 
have genotyping patterns that match at least one other isolate in a jurisdiction’s database are 
much more likely to represent recent transmission than isolates with nonmatching genotypes. 
The percentage of cases that are clustered gives the TB program a rough guide to the amount 
of recent transmission occurring in their jurisdiction. The genotyping laboratory report will 
designate whether each isolate belongs to a PCR cluster, which will make calculating the 
percentage of isolates that cluster by PCR straightforward. Since IS6110-based RFLP results 
will not be available for all isolates, the PCR/RFLP cluster designation will not be useful in 
calculating the percentage of isolates that cluster.  
In addition to calculating the clustering percentage, a TB program can also compare the 
incidence of clustered cases with the incidence of unclustered cases by dividing the number of 
clustered or unclustered cases in a year by the jurisdiction’s population. These incidence 
figures are better than the clustering index when comparing one jurisdiction’s TB 
epidemiology to another’s. 
Limitations of the PCR Clustering Percentage 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Combining Genotyping and Epidemiologic Data to Improve 
Our Understanding of Tuberculosis Transmission, the majority of TB cases that are clustered 
do not have epidemiologic links identified even when cluster investigations are conducted by 
skilled interviewers. Although some cases for whom no epidemiologic links were identified 
may have been involved in recent transmission (i.e., they were involved in recent casual 
transmission), this is probably unusual. Similarly, not all unclustered cases represent 
reactivation of previous infections. These uncertainties mean that the clustering percentage will 
be an imprecise measure of recent transmission.  
Some of the uncertainty involved in using the clustering percentage to estimate the 
frequency of recent transmission is minimized when it is used to monitor trends over time, 
since any bias that applies to a particular TB program’s population will be relatively constant 
over time, at least for a period of several years. 
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Epidemiologically Confirmed Recent Transmission Percentage 
Although the percentage of cases that are clustered (or the incidence of clustered cases) is 
a useful and easy-to-calculate estimate of recent transmission, it does not take into account 
whether the clustered cases were found to have epidemiologic links. If TB programs routinely 
collect and enter into their database information on epidemiologic links, the epidemiologically 
confirmed recent transmission percentage can be calculated, which is defined as the percentage 
of cases that are clustered by PCR and share known epidemiologic links. The confirmed recent 
transmission incidence can also be calculated by dividing the number of epidemiologically 
linked clustered cases each year by the jurisdiction’s population. 
Some TB programs have used an even more sophisticated approach to defining whether a 
case represents recent transmission. For each cluster, an attempt is made to identify the likely 
source case, based on which case had the earliest date of symptom onset. Because the time of 
TB acquisition for source cases is undefined, the source case is not counted as representing 
recent transmission. Others have used a shortcut to address the argument that the source case 
should not be counted by simply reducing the number of cases in each cluster by one. Another 
modification of the calculation of the recent transmission index is to include all cases in 
children less than 5 years of age, since they obviously acquired TB within the previous 5 years. 
Epidemiologically Confirmed Genotyping Cluster Surveillance  
Universal genotyping will help identify clusters that represent recent transmission at early 
stages and will provide TB programs with a tool to monitor the number of epidemiologically 
confirmed clusters that occur. To be useful, a standardized and easy-to-apply definition of an 
epidemiologically confirmed cluster must be developed.  
Identifying Source Cases 
Once a cluster is determined to represent recent transmission and the transmission 
dynamics that link the various cases are clarified, it is often possible to identify the patient or 
patients with infectious TB who were the sources of transmission. Information on source cases 
should be gathered and analyzed in a systematic fashion to understand the patient 
characteristics that are associated with recent transmission. Also important is to identify active 
clusters for which no source case is identified, since this might lead to a renewed search for an 
undetected infectious case.  
Added Value of Cluster Investigations 
Epidemiologically confirmed recent transmission is defined as cases that formed a 
genotyping cluster and shared epidemiologic links. The percentage of cases that represent 
recent transmission where the epidemiologic links were not identified during routine contact 
investigations but only later during cluster investigations represents the added value of cluster 
investigations. Data from NTGSN indicate that this added value represented 38% of all 
epidemiologically confirmed recent transmission (McNabb 2004). Both known and unknown 
source-secondary patient relationships represent missed opportunities for TB prevention. 
Findings from contact investigations, including identification of settings where recent 
transmission occurred, can be useful for improving contact investigations. Findings from 
contact investigations can also point out ways to utilize social network analyses to improve 
contact tracing, screening, and treatment for latent TB infection. 
Frequency of False-Positive Cultures 
Because universal genotyping should have an important impact on recognizing episodes 
of false-positive cultures, it will be useful for programs to monitor their occurrence. This will 
allow documentation of how well the program can identify instances of false-positive cultures 









AFB Acid-fast bacilli. Microorganisms that retain certain 
applied stains after being rinsed with an acid solution.  
Most acid-fast organisms detected in patient specimens are 
mycobacteria.  When viewed under the microscope using 
the Zhiel-Neelson staining method, M. tuberculosis 
bacteria appear red on a blue background.  When AFB are 
seen on a stained smear of sputum or other specimen, a 
diagnosis of TB disease should be suspected, and the 
concentration of organisms per unit area of slide (the 
smear grade) correlates with the degree of infectiousness.  
The diagnosis of TB disease is usually not confirmed until 
a culture is grown and M. tuberculosis is identified.  A 
positive nucleic acid amplification (NAA) test is useful as 
a confirmatory test. 
 
Agarose gel electrophoresis A laboratory method used to separate molecules. IS6110-
based RFLP uses agarose gel electrophoresis to separate 
DNA fragments by size.  
 
BCG Bacille Calmette Guérin. A BCG isolate is commonly used 
as a control strain in spoligotyping assays. 
 
Beijing strain An isolate of the Beijing strain of M. tuberculosis is 
commonly used as a control strain in spoligotyping assays, 
since it has an unusual octal designation: 
00000000000371. 
 
Casual contact Contact between a source case and someone else that is not 
prolonged and often that occurs in a nontraditional setting. 
The common teaching that TB is not transmitted by casual 
contact needs to be revised in light of genotyping studies 
that show it occurs more commonly than was once 
thought. 
 
Chain of recent transmission Patients with TB who have transmitted M. tuberculosis 
among themselves recently. Genotyping provides 
additional information to traditional epidemiologic links to 
define chains of recent transmission, since patients who are 
involved in the same chain of recent transmission will 
almost always have M. tuberculosis isolates that have 
matching genotypes. 
 
CLIA Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments. The CLIA 
program is operated by the Department of Health and 




Close contact A person who has shared the same air space with a person 
who has infectious TB disease and is among those of 
highest priority of triaged contacts based on historical, 
social, and epidemiologic data to warrant investigation.   
 
Cluster  A genotyping cluster is two or more M. tuberculosis 
isolates that share matching genotypes. An epidemiologic 
cluster is two or more persons with TB who share known 
epidemiologic links. See Cluster investigation, 
Epidemiologic cluster, Genotyping cluster, 
epidemiologically confirmed genotyping cluster. 
 
Cluster investigation An investigation to identify epidemiologic links between 
TB patients whose isolates have matching genotypes. A 
cluster investigation may consist of reviewing information 
from medical records and interviewing case managers and 
outreach workers. It can also involve interviewing TB 
patients. The term has also been used to describe an 
investigation of TB patients who share epidemiologic links 
before genotyping results are known. 
  
Contact investigation An investigation of persons who have come into contact 
with a patient with infectious TB. The goals of a contact 
investigation are to identify additional persons with active 
TB, to determine if transmission occurred between the TB 
patient and the contacts, and to identify person with latent 
TB infection who are candidates for treatment. 
 
Cross-jurisdiction transmission Transmission of TB from a patient who resides in one TB 
program jurisdiction to a person who lives in another TB 
program jurisdiction. Since genotyping results are not 
automatically shared between TB program jurisdictions, 
special attention needs to be paid to this possibility. 
 
Drug susceptibility test A laboratory test to determine if a M. tuberculosis isolate 
is susceptible to a specific drug used to treat TB. 
  
DNA genotyping A laboratory approach that provides a description of the 
genetic makeup of a M. tuberculosis complex isolate. 
 
Endemic strain A strain of M. tuberculosis that has circulated in a 
relatively closed population for many years. Patients who 
are infected with endemic strains are often not involved in 
the same chain of recent transmission (i.e., within the 
previous 2 years), even though the genotypes of the 
isolates from the patients match. (See Braden 1997.) 
 
Epidemiologic cluster Two or more persons with TB who share known 
epidemiologic links. Many scientists use the term “cluster” 
to refer only to isolates with matching genotypes, but the 
term “epidemiologic cluster” has become common enough 
to include as a legitimate term. 
 
Epidemiologically confirmed Genotyping cluster that contains TB patients with known 





Epidemiologic (Epi) link A characteristic that two TB patients share that explains 
where and when TB could have been transmitted between 
them. An epidemiologic link could be a location where the 
two persons spent time together or a relationship that 
brought them together. A known epidemiologic link is 
defined as either a) one of the patients named the other as a 
contact during one of the patient’s infectious period or b) 
the two patients were at the same place at the same time 
during one of the patient’s infectious period. A possible 
epidemiologic link is defined as either a) the two patients 
spent time at the same place but the timing of when they 
were there or the timing of the infectious period was not 
definite enough to meet the criteria for a known 
epidemiologic link; OR b) the two patients lived in the 
same neighborhood around the same period of time; OR c) 
the two patients worked in or were at the same geographic 
area around the same period of time and shared social or 
behavioral traits that increased the chances of 
transmission.  
 
Exposed cohort A group of people who shared the same air space with a 
TB patient during the patient’s infectious period. An 
outbreak investigation focuses on defining the exposed 
cohort for infectious TB patients in order to identify 
contacts that need to be screened for TB and latent TB 
infection. 
 
False-positive culture Cultures or reports of cultures of M. tuberculosis that are 
not accurate. False-positive cultures occur when M. 
tuberculosis bacteria from one specimen, instrument, or 
culture inadvertently contaminate another specimen or 
culture or when clerical errors occur and specimens are 
mislabeled or misreported. Clinical equipment (e.g., 
bronchoscopes, sputum collection booths, and ultrasonic 
nebulizers), if inadequately cleaned, can become 
contaminated and be the source of false-positive cultures. 
Cross-contamination can occur in the laboratory during 
batch processing, pipetting, transfer of bacilli from a broth-
culture system, work in a faulty exhaust hood, or species-
identification procedures.  
 
Fingerprinting Refers to TB genotyping using IS6110-based RFLP 
analysis. 
 
Genetic cluster Synonym for Genotyping cluster. 
 
Genotype  The designation that results from one or more of the three 
genotyping techniques used for M. tuberculosis: 




Genotyping cluster  A group of isolates that share the same genotyping pattern. 
This term is also applied to the TB patients who produced 
the isolates with the same pattern. The genotyping 
laboratories will report a PCR cluster designation for 
isolates with spoligotypes and MIRU types that match 
other isolates from the same TB program. The laboratories 
will report a PCR/RFLP cluster designation for isolates in 
the same PCR cluster that also have the same RFLP 
pattern. 
  
Genotyping match Two or more M. tuberculosis isolates that share the same 
genotype. 
 
Genotyping Also referred to as DNA genotyping. A laboratory 
approach used to determine if M. tuberculosis isolates are 
genetically related.  
 
H37Rv strain The H37Rv M. tuberculosis strain is commonly used as a 
control strain in laboratory assays. 
 
Immunocompromised A condition in which the immune system is not 
functioning normally.  According to some style experts, 
immunocompromised is the broader term, and 
immunosuppression is restricted to states with iatrogenic 
causes, including causes that result from therapy for 
another condition. Immunocompromised persons are at 
greatly increased risk for progressing to TB disease after 
infection with M. tuberculosis.  Immunocompromised 
conditions also make TB disease more difficult to 
diagnosis, increasing the likelihood of a false-negative 
result for a test for M. tuberculosis (e.g., TST). 
 
Index case The first TB patient identified in cluster. The index case is 
not necessarily the source case. 
 
Infectious period The time period during which a person with TB disease is 
considered infectious and capable of transmitting M. 
tuberculosis to persons who share the same air space. See 
Chapter 4, Combining Genotyping and Epidemiologic 
Data to Improve Our Understanding of Tuberculosis 
Transmission, for details. 
 
IS6110 RFLP Insertion sequence 6110 (read “I- S-sixty-one-ten”) is a 
genetic marker apparently unique to members of the M. 
tuberculosis complex. IS6110-based restriction fragment 
length polymorphism (RFLP) analysis was the first widely 
used method for genotyping M. tuberculosis isolates. 
 
Jurisdiction The geographic extent of a TB program’s coverage. The 
jurisdiction of a county health department is that county. 
 




Manila strain A family of isolates of M. tuberculosis found commonly 
among immigrants from Manila. The spoligotype and 
MIRU genotype of Manila strain isolates are similar, yet in 
most cases, patients infected with the Manila strain do not 
represent recent transmission. IS6110-based RFLP is 
helpful in distinguishing between Manila strain isolates 
within a PCR cluster. 
 
Matching genotypes Two or more M. tuberculosis isolates that share the same 
genotype. See Chapter 4, Combining Genotyping and 
Epidemiologic Data to Improve Our Understanding of 
Tuberculosis Transmission, for more information. 
 
MDR and MDR TB Multidrug-resistant and multidrug-resistant tuberculosis. 
M. tuberculosis strains that are resistant to at least 
isoniazid (INH) and rifampin. 
 
MIRU Mycobacterial interspersed repetitive unit analysis (read 
“MIR-ooh”). MIRU is a PCR-based genotyping assay. The 
CDC genotyping program requires the regional genotyping 
laboratories to perform MIRU analysis on every isolate 
submitted. See Chapter 3, CDC Tuberculosis Genotyping 
Laboratory Procedures, for more information. 
 
M. tuberculosis complex Often abbreviated MTC, a group of closely related 
mycobacterial species that can cause LTBI and TB disease 
(i.e., M. tuberculosis, M. bovis, M. africanum, M. canetti, 
M. microti, and the  BCG strain).  Most TB in the United 
States is caused by M. tuberculosis. 
 
Nonmatching genotype An isolate that has a unique genotype (i.e., a genotype 
pattern that does not match the pattern of any other isolate 
in a TB program’s database). 
 
Nontraditional setting A setting where TB transmission took place that is not 
considered a traditional transmission setting, such as the 
home or workplace. Common nontraditional transmission 
settings identified during cluster investigations have 
included bars and social clubs, churches/temples, and 
drug/crack houses. 
 
Nonviable cultures Organisms that can no longer be grown in culture. 
Genotyping techniques that are based on the PCR test can 
by performed on nonviable cultures. IS6110-based RFLP, 
on the other hand, requires viable cultures that can be 
grown until they provide sufficient material. 
  




NTGSN National Tuberculosis Genotyping and Surveillance 
Network. This network was established by CDC in 1996 to 
assess the utility of molecular genotyping for improving 
tuberculosis prevention and control. The NTGSN study 
included seven laboratories and seven sentinel surveillance 
sites in the United States. Sentinel surveillance sites 
included the states of Arkansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, and New Jersey and six counties in California 
(Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, San Mateo, Santa Clara, 
and Solano); and four counties in Texas (Dallas, Tarrant, 
Cameron, and Hidalgo). 
 
Octal designation To simplify the recording of the results of spoligotyping, 
the results are given as an octal representation. The octal 
designation uses base 8, which contains the numbers 0--7. 
Any spoligotyping banding pattern can be converted to an 
octal designation, and any octal designation can be 
converted back to give the original hybridization pattern. 
See Chapter 3, CDC Tuberculosis Genotyping Laboratory 
Procedures, for details. 
 
Outbreak An increase in the number of TB cases in time and space 
over that which is expected. See Chapter 6, Applying 
Genotyping Results to Tuberculosis Control Practices, for 
more information. 
 
Outbreak investigation An investigation of an outbreak with the goals of  a) 
identifying and treating all cases of active TB so that 
transmission stops and b) identifying all cases of LTBI that 
would benefit from treatment and assuring that it is 
completed so the outbreak does not continue in the future. 
 
PCR Polymerase chain reaction. The CDC genotyping program 
uses two PCR-based techniques --- spoligotyping and 
MIRU analysis. Only a small amount of culture is needed 
for PCR-based genotyping, and the PCR test can be 
completed in 1day (because the PCR tests are batched, the 
actual turn-around time from receipt of a specimen to 
reporting the results can be longer). 
 
PCR cluster designation The genotyping laboratories will assign a PCR cluster 
designation to M. tuberculosis isolates that have matching 
genotypes by the two PCR tests, spoligotyping and MIRU 
analysis. See Chapter 4, Combining Genotyping and 
Epidemiologic Data to Improve Our Understanding of 
Tuberculosis Transmission, for details. 
 
PCR/RFLP cluster designation The genotyping laboratories will assign a PCR/RFLP 
cluster designation to M. tuberculosis isolates that belong 
to the same PCR cluster and are demonstrated to have the 
same RFLP pattern. See Chapter 3, CDC Tuberculosis 




Recent transmission  The transmission of TB that has occurred in the recent 
past, as opposed to reactivation of a latent TB infection. 
Although the precise time period that distinguishes TB that 
resulted from “recent” transmission and TB that resulted 
from reactivation of a latent infection is not well defined, 
“recent” transmission is often considered to be within the 
last 2 years. 
 
Reinfection vs. relapse A case of relapsed TB represents a worsening of an 
infection after a period of improvement and is caused by 
the same strain of M. tuberculosis. TB that represents a 
reinfection is caused by a second infection with a strain 
that is different from the strain that caused the initial 
infection. Genotyping the initial and the subsequent M. 
tuberculosis isolate can distinguish these two possibilities. 
 
RFLP Restriction fragment length polymorphism. A genotyping 
technique based on measuring the number and length of 
specific DNA fragments that are cut using specific 
restriction enzymes. The RFLP technique used to genotype 
M. tuberculosis is based on the IS6110 insertion sequence. 
 
RVCT Report of a Verified Case of TB. National surveillance 
data on patients with tuberculosis is recorded onto this 
report form.  
 
Selective genotyping The process of submitting only selected isolates for 
genotyping. Because of the cost of submitting all isolates 
for genotyping (i.e., “universal genotyping”), some 
programs may initially have to select only high-priority 
isolates to be submitted for genotyping. See Chapter 5, 
Developing a Tuberculosis Genotyping Program, for more 
information. 
 
Source patient A patient with infectious TB who is thought to be the 
source of another patient’s TB infection. Also referred to 
as the source case. 
 
Spoligotyping Spacer oligonucleotide genotyping. A genotyping 
technique based on spacer sequences found in the direct 
repeat region in the M. tuberculosis chromosome. See 
Chapter 3, CDC Tuberculosis Genotyping Laboratory 
Procedures, for more information. 
 
Traditional settings Usual or suspected settings for TB transmission, such as 
the home or workplace. See also Nontraditional setting. 
 
TST Tuberculin skin test. 
 
Unique genotype A genotype designation that does not match that of any 
other isolate in a TB program’s database. 
 
Universal genotyping The policy of submitting all M. tuberculosis isolates for 
genotyping. See Chapter 5, Developing a Tuberculosis 




VNTR Variable number tandem repeat analysis. VNTR is a type 
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3.  Information on Packaging and Shipping Infectious Substances 
Cultures of Mycobacterium tuberculosis are considered “infectious substances” according 
to regulations of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) and the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA). Shipping of infectious substances must follow regulations 
established by both organizations. 
 
Useful information can be obtained at the following websites: 
 
1. http://hazmat.dot.gov/pubtrain/infect.pdf  
Graphic summary of acceptable packaging containers for infectious substances.  
 
2. http://www.myregs.com/dotrspa/ 
DOT regulations that pertain to the shipment of hazardous substances.  
 
3. http://www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/biosfty/shipregs.htm 
General information about shipping regulations for infectious substances. 
 
 
Some of the salient regulations: 
 
• Personnel who prepare and ship specimens must receive specific training and pass a 
competence examination. Training must be repeated every 2 years (refresher and update). 
 
• Infectious substances must be packaged according to IATA Packing Instruction 602 and a 
shipper’s declaration for dangerous goods form must be prepared. 
 
• The genotyping laboratory must be notified by fax or e-mail when a package is shipped. 
 
• Packages must be sent by a carrier that has tracking capability so that lost packages can 
be located. 
 
Note:  Dry ice must not be used unless other IATA precautions and regulations are followed. 
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4. Core Steps of an Outbreak Investigation 
1. Confirm that it meets epidemiologic definition of an outbreak (any one of the following) 
a. More cases than expected (surveillance) 
b. Cases epidemiologically clustered by time, space, or common behaviors 
 
2. Consider whether there is ongoing transmission (one of the following) 
a. Did regular contact investigations reveal epidemiologic links or similarities 
among cases? 
b. Did the laboratory identity a genotyping cluster that confirms the 
epidemiologic links identified by regular contact investigation? 
c. Did the laboratory identify a genotyping or epidemiologic cluster of lab 
isolates clustered in time and space where there is discordance between the 
clinical course of the patient and the laboratory results (false-positive culture)? 
 
3. Define an outbreak-related case 
 
4. Confirm existing number of outbreak-related cases 
 
5. Investigate existing outbreak-related cases by reviewing  
a. Medical records (history, physical, clinical chart, and notes) 
b. Laboratory records (serial results of smears, cultures, drug sensitivities, and 
other testing) 
c. Review genotyping results for all culture-positive cases (if not already done, 
submit isolates for genotyping) 
i. If lab results are implausible and the clinical course of the patient 
does not support TB diagnosis or the clinician does not think that 
there is concordance between lab results and clinical course of the 
patient to support TB diagnosis, consider possibility of false-
positive cultures 
d. Chest radiographs (including old baseline films, if possible) 
e. Tuberculosis clinic and other pertinent public health records 
f. Cross match outbreak-related cases with county jail, state prison, and STD 
registries 
g. All data from regularly conducted contact investigations (re-interview case-
patients and their contacts as necessary) 
 
6. Determine the infectious period for each outbreak-related case based on  
a. Laboratory results (e.g., sputum smear-positive patients are thought to be more 
infectious) 
b. Serial chest radiographs (e.g., patients with cavitary lung lesions are thought to 
be more infectious) 
c. Date of onset and duration of signs and symptoms  
d. Results of screening of named contacts (e.g., a high percentage of TST-
positive contacts) 
 
7. Determine the sites and facilities frequented and family and social groups exposed by 
outbreak-related patients during their infectious periods  
a. Information from case-patient interviews and contact investigations 
b. Information from medical and public health records 
c. Information from the facility logs or records 
 
8. Determine the exposed cohort of persons at each site/facility who may have been present 
when an outbreak-related case-patient was present during his/her infectious period  
a. Information from case-patient interviews and contact investigations 
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b. Information from medical and public health records 
c. Information from the facility logs or records 
 
9. Determine the duration by number of hours, days, or weeks. for the exposed cohort of 
persons who may have spent around an infectious outbreak-related patient 
a. Information from case-patient interviews and contact investigations 
b. Information from medical and public health records 
c. Information from the facility logs or records 
 
10. Prioritize exposed cohorts for screening (active case finding and latent TB infection) 
based on: 
a. Type (e.g., indoor versus outdoor, intimate versus casual), frequency, and 
duration of exposure 
b. Risk of progression to active disease 
 
11. Define elements of and action plan for screening, implementation, and follow-up 
 
12. Identify resources necessary for action plan to be carried out 
 
13. Create a media plan to respond to possible inquiries 
 
14. Assign responsibilities and set deadlines 
 
15. If necessary, expand screening to include low-priority cohorts after screening high-
priority cohorts based on evidence of transmission 
 
16. Evaluate, treat, and follow up additional TB disease case-patients and latent TB infected 
persons associated with this outbreak 
 
17. Make and implement recommendations to prevent future outbreaks for particular 
populations or settings involved 
 
18. Evaluate outbreak response  
 
19. Determine whether interventions have effectively stopped TB transmission in this 
situation. 
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Phone: 410-767-6693  Fax:     410-669-4215 
E-mail: croninw@dhmh.state.md.us  
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Director, Division of Tuberculosis Prevention and Control 
Massachusetts Department of Public Health 
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